{"id":4801,"date":"2026-02-12T09:34:16","date_gmt":"2026-02-12T09:34:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/?p=4801"},"modified":"2026-04-02T05:58:01","modified_gmt":"2026-04-02T05:58:01","slug":"russia-nato-and-the-fear-of-war-what-can-and-cannot-be-proven","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/02\/russia-nato-and-the-fear-of-war-what-can-and-cannot-be-proven\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia, NATO and the fear of war: what can be proven - and what can't"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>This article is not the result of a current impulse, indignation or partisanship. Rather, it is the result of a long period of observation - and a growing sense of unease. I have been studying Russia not just since the war in Ukraine. My interest goes back further. I had already studied Russian as a foreign language at school, and at that time I studied the language, history and mentality in a very relaxed way. This early interest led me to follow developments there over the years without constantly changing my perspective.<\/p>\n<p>This is precisely why I am shocked today by how crude, how simplistic and how self-assured many images about Russia and its alleged goals are placed in the public sphere - often without sources, without context, sometimes even without any internal logic. It becomes particularly irritating when such narratives not only appear in talk shows or commentary columns, but are also adopted almost without reflection by journalists, politicians or other official voices. At some point, the question inevitably arises:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p><em>Is that actually true?<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n\n\t\t\t<div class=\"display-post-types\">\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<style type=\"text\/css\">\n\t\t\t#dpt-wrapper-824 { --dpt-text-align: left;--dpt-image-crop: center;--dpt-border-radius: 5px;--dpt-h-gutter: 10px;--dpt-v-gutter: 9px; }\t\t\t<\/style>\n\t\t\t<style type=\"text\/css\">#dpt-wrapper-824 { --dpt-title-font-style:normal;--dpt-title-font-weight:600;--dpt-title-line-height:1.5;--dpt-title-text-decoration:none;--dpt-title-text-transform:none;--dpt-excerpt-font-style:normal;--dpt-excerpt-font-weight:400;--dpt-excerpt-line-height:1.5;--dpt-excerpt-text-decoration:none;--dpt-excerpt-text-transform:none;--dpt-meta1-font-style:normal;--dpt-meta1-font-weight:400;--dpt-meta1-line-height:1.9;--dpt-meta1-text-decoration:none;--dpt-meta1-text-transform:none;--dpt-meta2-font-style:normal;--dpt-meta2-font-weight:400;--dpt-meta2-line-height:1.9;--dpt-meta2-text-decoration:none;--dpt-meta2-text-transform:none; }<\/style><div class=\"dpt-main-header\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-main-title\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class=\"dpt-main-title-text\">Social issues of the present<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t<div id=\"dpt-wrapper-824\" class=\"dpt-wrapper dpt-mag1 land1 dpt-cropped dpt-flex-wrap\" >\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"was ist brics \u2013 und was nicht: geschichte, wirtschaft und geopolitische einordnung\" data-id=\"4691\"  data-category=\"allgemein gesellschaft\" data-post_tag=\"denkmodelle deutschland europa geopolitik sicherheitspolitik\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/02\/what-is-brics-and-what-is-not-history-economy-and-geopolitical-classification\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">What is BRICS - 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and what is not: history, economy and geopolitical classification<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"digitales geld verstehen: bitcoin, stablecoins und cbdcs einfach erkl\u00e4rt\" data-id=\"4211\"  data-category=\"allgemein gesellschaft\" data-post_tag=\"datenschutz digitales eigentum eu-gesetze europa geopolitik spieltheorie\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/understanding-digital-money-bitcoin-stablecoins-and-cbdcs-explained-simply\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Understanding digital money: Bitcoin, stablecoins and CBDCs explained simply<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"CBDCs, cryptocurrencies and stablecoins\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/cbcd-kryptos-coins-tokens.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/cbcd-kryptos-coins-tokens.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/cbcd-kryptos-coins-tokens-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/cbcd-kryptos-coins-tokens-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/cbcd-kryptos-coins-tokens-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/cbcd-kryptos-coins-tokens-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/understanding-digital-money-bitcoin-stablecoins-and-cbdcs-explained-simply\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">Understanding digital money: Bitcoin, stablecoins and CBDCs explained simply<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"der iran\u2013israel-konflikt: warum diese eskalation der strategische albtraum des westens ist\" data-id=\"5212\"  data-category=\"allgemein gesellschaft\" data-post_tag=\"denkmodelle energiepolitik europa geopolitik krisen k\u00fcnstliche intelligenz meinungsfreiheit sicherheitspolitik spieltheorie\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/03\/the-iran-israel-conflict-why-this-escalation-is-the-wests-strategic-nightmare\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">The Iran-Israel conflict: Why this escalation is the West's strategic nightmare<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"Israel-Iran - Strategic nightmare\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Israel-Iran-Strategischer-Albtraum.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Israel-Iran-Strategischer-Albtraum.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Israel-Iran-Strategischer-Albtraum-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Israel-Iran-Strategischer-Albtraum-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Israel-Iran-Strategischer-Albtraum-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Israel-Iran-Strategischer-Albtraum-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/03\/the-iran-israel-conflict-why-this-escalation-is-the-wests-strategic-nightmare\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">The Iran-Israel conflict: Why this escalation is the West's strategic nightmare<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"dauerkrise als normalzustand: wie narrative unsere wahrnehmung verzerren\" data-id=\"3840\"  data-category=\"allgemein b\u00fccher gesellschaft\" data-post_tag=\"buch deutschland energiepolitik erfahrungen europa krisen meinungsfreiheit pers\u00f6nlichkeitsentwicklung\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/12\/permanent-crisis-as-a-normal-state-how-narratives-distort-our-perception\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Permanent crisis as a normal state: How narratives distort our perception<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"Permanent crisis, narratives\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/dauerkrise-narrative.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/dauerkrise-narrative.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/dauerkrise-narrative-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/dauerkrise-narrative-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/dauerkrise-narrative-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/dauerkrise-narrative-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/12\/permanent-crisis-as-a-normal-state-how-narratives-distort-our-perception\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">Permanent crisis as a normal state: How narratives distort our perception<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\n<hr \/>\n<h2>Latest news on NATO and Russia<\/h2>\n<p><strong>02.04.2026<\/strong>As the Swiss magazine Infosperber reports in an article, there are also significantly differing assessments of the current debate about a possible threat to Europe from Russia. A recent article argues that Russia's military capabilities are overestimated in view of the high losses in the Ukraine war and comparatively low territorial gains. The conclusion drawn is that a massive <a href=\"https:\/\/www.infosperber.ch\/politik\/welt\/aufruesten-gegen-ein-bedrohliches-russland-ist-geldverschwendung\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><strong>Armament against Russia a waste of money<\/strong><\/a> be.<\/p>\n<p>The authors point out that Russia has only made limited progress despite massive efforts over several years and at the same time is under considerable economic and personnel pressure. Against this background, the widespread demand for extensive rearmament in Europe is critically questioned and described as economically questionable. The article also sees structural interests behind the exaggerated threat perception, for example from the arms industry. This assessment is in clear contrast to current political and military warnings.<\/p>\n<p><strong>17.03.2026<\/strong>Harald Kujat, former Inspector General of the German Armed Forces and former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, asks in his detailed lecture whether the current perception of the war in Ukraine is complete or is shaped by political and media frameworks. He sheds light on both military and diplomatic aspects and points out that earlier negotiation approaches hardly play a role in the public debate anymore. Kujat argues for a return to diplomacy and questions whether a one-sided focus on military solutions is sustainable in the long term.<\/p>\n<div class=\"lyte-wrapper\" style=\"width:640px;max-width:100%;margin:5px;\"><div class=\"lyMe\" id=\"WYL_oxpiBN9FwjY\"><div id=\"lyte_oxpiBN9FwjY\" data-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/plugins\/wp-youtube-lyte\/lyteCache.php?origThumbUrl=%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FoxpiBN9FwjY%2Fhqdefault.jpg\" class=\"pL\"><div class=\"tC\"><div class=\"tT\"><\/div><\/div><div class=\"play\"><\/div><div class=\"ctrl\"><div class=\"Lctrl\"><\/div><div class=\"Rctrl\"><\/div><\/div><\/div><noscript><a href=\"https:\/\/youtu.be\/oxpiBN9FwjY\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/plugins\/wp-youtube-lyte\/lyteCache.php?origThumbUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FoxpiBN9FwjY%2F0.jpg\" alt=\"YouTube video thumbnail\" width=\"640\" height=\"340\" \/><br \/>Watch this video on YouTube<\/a><\/noscript><\/div><\/div><div class=\"lL\" style=\"max-width:100%;width:640px;margin:5px;\"><\/div><br \/>\nUkraine war, NATO &amp; diplomacy - \u201eWays out of the logic of war\u201c with Harald Kujat! | <a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/@IPPNWgermany\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">IPPNWgermany<\/a><\/p>\n<p>A short excerpt from this presentation has already been published in the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/propaganda-history-methods-modern-forms-and-how-to-recognize-them\/\"><strong>Propaganda article<\/strong><\/a> in which he uses a specific anecdote to describe media mechanisms. The full lecture now provides the wider context and supplements the analysis with security policy and historical classifications.<\/p>\n<p><strong>19.02.2026<\/strong>: Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz has in a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.spiegel.de\/politik\/friedrich-merz-sieht-russland-im-zustand-der-tiefsten-barbarei-a-68218964-7266-43a6-9c1d-f34e08ca5d6c\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><strong>latest interview<\/strong><\/a> has spoken very clearly about the current situation in the Ukraine conflict. According to reports, Merz sees little chance that the war can be ended quickly through negotiations. He said that this war will end first, <em>\u201ewhen one of the two sides is exhausted, either militarily or economically\u201c<\/em>. With regard to Russia, he described the state of the country with the words <em>\u201edeepest barbarism\u201c<\/em>, and he emphasized that reason and humanitarian arguments would not convince Russian President Vladimir Putin. Merz described it as Europe's goal to weaken Russia economically and militarily so that it could not continue the war. At the same time, he pointed out that the Russian leadership apparently had no plan for what to do with the traumatized soldiers after a possible end to the war.<\/p>\n<p><strong>16.02.2026<\/strong>After the Munich Security Conference, the German Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, Carsten Breuer, and the British Chief of the General Staff, Richard Knighton, have issued an open joint appeal for a significant rearmament of Europe, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.spiegel.de\/ausland\/bedrohung-durch-russland-carsten-breuer-und-richard-knighton-fordern-aufruestung-europas-a-460da50a-5062-44dd-b46e-00b1e965b0d2\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><strong>reports Spiegel Online<\/strong><\/a>. The two highest-ranking military officers in Germany and the UK warn of a growing military threat from Russia and call for greater defense readiness, stronger capabilities and closer cooperation. The letter, which first appeared in international media such as The Guardian and Die Welt, is intended to convey the \u201euncomfortable truths\u201c about the security situation to the population. This call for more investment stands in stark contrast to calls for de-escalation and diplomatic d\u00e9tente.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h2>The omnipresent narrative of the impending attack<\/h2>\n<p>Anyone who consumes the news today will repeatedly come across similar statements: Russia wants to restore the Soviet Union, the next step after Ukraine will be the Baltic states, Poland or even Germany. War, they say, could \u201ecome to us\u201c. We should be grateful that others are fighting it \u201efor us\u201c.<\/p>\n<p>These statements are now so prevalent that they are hardly questioned. They seem like established facts, not theses or interpretations. But this is where the problem begins: the more often an assertion is repeated, the less it is checked to see whether it is at all reliable.<\/p>\n<p>This article aims to address precisely this point. Not with counter-slogans, but with a simple, almost old-fashioned question:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>What can actually be proven - and what is merely claimed?<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h3>Between fear, morality and analysis<\/h3>\n<p>It is understandable that the war in Ukraine triggers fears. War in Europe is not an abstract idea, but a real experience of our history. However, it is all the more important to make a clear distinction between emotion and analysis, between moral evaluation and strategic assessment, especially in times like these.<\/p>\n<p>Instead, these levels are often mixed up. Anyone who asks questions is quickly seen as naive or suspicious. Those who differentiate come under pressure to justify themselves. Yet differentiation is not a sign of indifference, but of responsibility.<\/p>\n<p>This text therefore pursues a clear objective: it neither glosses over nor dramatizes. It wants to put things in order. This article is not a defense of Russian policy. Nor is it a relativization of suffering or violence. Nor is it an attack on people who come to different conclusions. What it wants to achieve is something else:<\/p>\n<p>a sober classification of what is said about Russian goals, what was actually said, which interests are plausible - and which assumptions have surprisingly little substance on closer inspection.<\/p>\n<p>This will also involve uncomfortable questions. For example, what real benefits Russia would gain from an attack on a NATO country. Or why certain narratives are so persistent, even though they hardly hold up logically. And also what role Western politics, media logic and security policy routines play in this.<\/p>\n<h3>An invitation to think along<\/h3>\n<p>This article is not aimed at any particular political camp. It assumes no prior knowledge and does not demand agreement. It simply invites you to take your time - for context, for original statements, for sober reflection.<\/p>\n<p>Perhaps you will end up seeing things differently than before. Perhaps you will also stick to your assessment. Both are legitimate. The only thing that matters is that your judgments are based on a solid foundation. Because one thing is certain:<\/p>\n<p>At a time when fear has become a political factor, a clear, calm mind is not a luxury, but a necessity.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-full wp-image-4895\" src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Medien-Narrative.jpg\" alt=\"Media and narratives on Russia and Putin\" width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Medien-Narrative.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Medien-Narrative-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Medien-Narrative-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Medien-Narrative-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Medien-Narrative-18x12.jpg 18w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" \/><\/p>\n<h2>Where the narrative comes from: The Soviet Union as a permanent image of terror<\/h2>\n<p>In order to understand why there is so much talk today of an alleged restoration of the Soviet Union, it is worth taking a look back. Not to revive old fronts, but to understand which images are still at work in the collective memory today - often unconsciously.<\/p>\n<p>For many people in the West, the Soviet Union was more than just a state for decades. It was a projection surface, an adversary, a symbol of threat. The Cold War was not only a geopolitical conflict, but also a psychological one. Two systems faced each other, both convinced of their own moral superiority. During this time, a world view emerged that was strongly based on opposites:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Freedom here, oppression there;<\/li>\n<li>Prosperity here, scarcity there;<\/li>\n<li>Democracy here, dictatorship there.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>These simplifications were politically functional - and they still have an impact today.<\/p>\n<h3>Decay as \u201evictory\u201c - and its shadows<\/h3>\n<p>When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, this was largely interpreted as a historical triumph in the West. The systemic conflict seemed to have been resolved, history - it was believed - had found its direction. Terms such as \u201ethe end of history\u201c were bandied about, and there was a feeling that a phase of lasting stability was now beginning.<\/p>\n<p>What has often been overlooked: For Russia itself, this disintegration not only meant political reorganization, but also a deep economic, social and cultural rupture. Entire industries collapsed, state structures collapsed and lives were devalued. Overnight, millions of people found themselves in new states without having moved. This experience continues to shape Russian self-image to this day.<\/p>\n<p>But while this perspective hardly played a role in the West, a different interpretation became entrenched there: the former enemy had been defeated - and now had to be permanently controlled so that it did not \u201ereturn\u201c.<\/p>\n<h3>From historical opponent to timeless warning image<\/h3>\n<p>This way of thinking gave rise to a narrative that remains surprisingly stable to this day: everything Russia does politically is reflexively measured against the Soviet Union. Criticism of Western policies is quickly seen as revanchism, security concerns as imperial ambition, historical references as evidence of expansionist plans.<\/p>\n<p>It is often overlooked that Russia - despite its authoritarian traits - is no longer an ideological system exporter. There is no global mission, no competing social model that is to be imposed on other countries. Nevertheless, the old scare image remains effective because it is familiar. It provides simple explanations in a complex world.<\/p>\n<p>This automatically turns any tension into a repeat of the Cold War - even if the framework conditions are fundamentally different.<\/p>\n<h3>Media logic and political shortcuts<\/h3>\n<p>Narratives do not emerge in a vacuum. They are reinforced by media logic, political communication and the human need for orientation. A familiar image of a threat is easier to convey than a differentiated analysis.<\/p>\n<p>In this sense, the formula \u201eRussia wants the Soviet Union back\u201c is a communicative shortcut. It saves on explanations, replaces complicated interests with moral certainty and creates a clear allocation of roles. Good and evil are quickly assigned, doubts appear unnecessary or even dangerous.<\/p>\n<p>It becomes problematic when these shortcuts become the basis for real decisions - for example in security or foreign policy. Because turning a historical horror story into a current certainty narrows the view and reduces the scope for action.<\/p>\n<h3>Between past and present<\/h3>\n<p>It is important to make a clear distinction here: yes, Russia often refers to history. Yes, historical experience plays a major role in Russian politics. But historical reference is not synonymous with a plan for the territorial restoration of past empires.<\/p>\n<p>Many states - including Western ones - use history to establish identity, justify interests or generate legitimacy. The decisive difference lies not in the recourse to history, but in how concrete policy is derived from it.<\/p>\n<p>This is exactly where the next level of analysis comes in: What was actually said? Which goals can be derived from this - and which not?<\/p>\n<p>The image of the imminent re-establishment of the Soviet Union is therefore less the result of reliable evidence than an expression of historical imprinting. It explains a lot - especially in the West itself. It explains fears, political reflexes, media exaggerations. But it explains surprisingly little about Russia's real interests and scope for action in the 21st century.<\/p>\n<p>The next step is needed to distinguish between them: looking at specific statements, speeches and texts. Not headlines, but originals. This is exactly what the following chapter is about.<\/p>\n<h3>Diplomacy between escalation and responsibility<\/h3>\n<p>The event on January 22, 2026 in D\u00fcsseldorf's Brauhaus am Dreieck is dedicated to a question that is becoming increasingly important in times of growing international tensions: What role can diplomacy still play today?<\/p>\n<p>Former Brigadier General and security policy advisor to the Chancellor, Erich Vad, discusses the risks of military escalation and the possibilities of political understanding with former Lord Mayor Thomas Geisel.<\/p>\n<div class=\"lyte-wrapper\" style=\"width:640px;max-width:100%;margin:5px;\"><div class=\"lyMe\" id=\"WYL_nOWnVaSjE3Y\"><div id=\"lyte_nOWnVaSjE3Y\" data-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/plugins\/wp-youtube-lyte\/lyteCache.php?origThumbUrl=%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FnOWnVaSjE3Y%2Fhqdefault.jpg\" class=\"pL\"><div class=\"tC\"><div class=\"tT\"><\/div><\/div><div class=\"play\"><\/div><div class=\"ctrl\"><div class=\"Lctrl\"><\/div><div class=\"Rctrl\"><\/div><\/div><\/div><noscript><a href=\"https:\/\/youtu.be\/nOWnVaSjE3Y\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/plugins\/wp-youtube-lyte\/lyteCache.php?origThumbUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FnOWnVaSjE3Y%2F0.jpg\" alt=\"YouTube video thumbnail\" width=\"640\" height=\"340\" \/><br \/>Watch this video on YouTube<\/a><\/noscript><\/div><\/div><div class=\"lL\" style=\"max-width:100%;width:640px;margin:5px;\"><\/div><br \/>\nWhy real politics starts with diplomacy? - Erich Vad and Thomas Geisel |\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/@WestendVerlag\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">Westend publishing house<\/a><\/p>\n<p>The focus is on strategic reason, realpolitik considerations and the responsibility of European players. The discussion ties in with Vad's book \u201e<a href=\"https:\/\/westendverlag.de\/Krieg-oder-Frieden-Deutschland-vor-der-Entscheidung\/2332\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">War or peace<\/a>\u201c and sees itself as a contribution to an open debate on security policy.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n\n\t\t\t<div class=\"display-post-types\">\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<style type=\"text\/css\">\n\t\t\t#dpt-wrapper-825 { --dpt-text-align: left;--dpt-image-crop: center;--dpt-border-radius: 5px;--dpt-h-gutter: 10px;--dpt-v-gutter: 10px; }\t\t\t<\/style>\n\t\t\t<style type=\"text\/css\">#dpt-wrapper-825 { --dpt-title-font-style:normal;--dpt-title-font-weight:600;--dpt-title-line-height:1.5;--dpt-title-text-decoration:none;--dpt-title-text-transform:none;--dpt-excerpt-font-style:normal;--dpt-excerpt-font-weight:400;--dpt-excerpt-line-height:1.5;--dpt-excerpt-text-decoration:none;--dpt-excerpt-text-transform:none;--dpt-meta1-font-style:normal;--dpt-meta1-font-weight:400;--dpt-meta1-line-height:1.9;--dpt-meta1-text-decoration:none;--dpt-meta1-text-transform:none;--dpt-meta2-font-style:normal;--dpt-meta2-font-weight:400;--dpt-meta2-line-height:1.9;--dpt-meta2-text-decoration:none;--dpt-meta2-text-transform:none; }<\/style><div class=\"dpt-main-header\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-main-title\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class=\"dpt-main-title-text\">Current articles on Germany<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t<div id=\"dpt-wrapper-825\" class=\"dpt-wrapper dpt-list2 land1 dpt-cropped dpt-flex-wrap\" >\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"kriegst\u00fcchtigkeit, wehrpflicht &#038; verweigerung: was im ernstfall zu tun ist\" data-id=\"2966\"  data-category=\"allgemein b\u00fccher gesellschaft tipps &amp; anleitungen\" data-post_tag=\"buch deutschland geopolitik gesundheit krisen pers\u00f6nlichkeitsentwicklung ratgeber sicherheitspolitik\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/09\/conscientious-objection-to-military-service-what-to-do-in-an-emergency\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Fitness for war, conscription &amp; refusal: what to do in an emergency<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"Conscription: refuse military service\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/wehrpflicht-kriegsdienst-verweigern.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/wehrpflicht-kriegsdienst-verweigern.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/wehrpflicht-kriegsdienst-verweigern-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/wehrpflicht-kriegsdienst-verweigern-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/wehrpflicht-kriegsdienst-verweigern-768x512.jpg 768w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/09\/conscientious-objection-to-military-service-what-to-do-in-an-emergency\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">Fitness for war, conscription &amp; refusal: what to do in an emergency<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"nord stream sprengung: sabotage, machtpolitik und die unbequemen offenen fragen\" data-id=\"4441\"  data-category=\"allgemein gesellschaft\" data-post_tag=\"deutschland energiepolitik europa geopolitik krisen meinungsfreiheit sicherheitspolitik spieltheorie\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/north-stream-blasting-sabotage-power-politics-and-the-uncomfortable-open-questions\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Nord Stream demolition: sabotage, power politics and the uncomfortable unanswered questions<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"Nord Stream blasting\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/nordstream-sprengung.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/nordstream-sprengung.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/nordstream-sprengung-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/nordstream-sprengung-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/nordstream-sprengung-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/nordstream-sprengung-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/north-stream-blasting-sabotage-power-politics-and-the-uncomfortable-open-questions\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">Nord Stream demolition: sabotage, power politics and the uncomfortable unanswered questions<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"wie war syrien vor dem krieg? wer regiert heute? was bedeutet das f\u00fcr gefl\u00fcchtete in deutschland?\" data-id=\"4628\"  data-category=\"allgemein gesellschaft kunst &amp; kultur\" data-post_tag=\"deutschland europa geopolitik krisen meinungsfreiheit sicherheitspolitik\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/what-was-syria-like-before-the-war-who-is-ruling-today-what-does-this-mean-for-refugees-in-germany\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">What was Syria like before the war? Who rules today? What does this mean for refugees in Germany?<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"Syria and Damascus\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Syrien-Damaskus.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Syrien-Damaskus.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Syrien-Damaskus-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Syrien-Damaskus-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Syrien-Damaskus-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Syrien-Damaskus-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/what-was-syria-like-before-the-war-who-is-ruling-today-what-does-this-mean-for-refugees-in-germany\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">What was Syria like before the war? Who rules today? What does this mean for refugees in Germany?<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"woher stammt sars-cov-2? ein sachlicher \u00dcberblick \u00fcber alle corona-theorien\" data-id=\"3521\"  data-category=\"allgemein gesellschaft gesundheit\" data-post_tag=\"deutschland gesundheit krisen sicherheitspolitik\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/11\/where-does-sars-cov-2-come-from-a-factual-overview-of-all-corona-theories\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Where does SARS-CoV-2 come from? A factual overview of all corona theories<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1440\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"SARS-CoV-2 - Corona\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/sars-covii-corona.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1440px) 100vw, 1440px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/sars-covii-corona.jpg 1440w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/sars-covii-corona-300x213.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/sars-covii-corona-1024x728.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/sars-covii-corona-768x546.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/sars-covii-corona-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/11\/where-does-sars-cov-2-come-from-a-factual-overview-of-all-corona-theories\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">Where does SARS-CoV-2 come from? A factual overview of all corona theories<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\n<hr \/>\n<h2>What Vladimir Putin actually said<\/h2>\n<p>Hardly any other contemporary political figure is quoted as frequently - and yet so rarely read in context - as Vladimir Putin. Individual sentences are extracted from speeches, shortened, sharpened and then declared to be evidence of far-reaching assumptions. This is precisely why it is worth taking a closer look: not at what is attributed to him, but at what he actually said - and in what context.<\/p>\n<p>This reveals a pattern that is less spectacular than is often claimed, but which therefore requires explanation.<\/p>\n<h3>The 2005 speech: loss, not reconquest<\/h3>\n<p>A frequently cited starting point is Putin's speech to the Federal Assembly in 2005, in which he described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the \u201egreatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century\u201c. To this day, this sentence is seen by many as proof of revanchist ambitions.<\/p>\n<p>However, if you read the speech in context, it becomes clear that Putin is not talking about territorial reconquest, but about the social and political consequences of disintegration. He refers to the millions of people who suddenly found themselves living outside Russia, to economic collapse, institutional weakness and the loss of the state's ability to act. The \u201ecatastrophe\u201c describes above all an internal crisis - not a foreign policy program.<\/p>\n<p>That is an important difference. You can criticize or reject this perspective, but it is not the same as announcing a new empire.<\/p>\n<h3>History as a framework for argumentation<\/h3>\n<p>A second recurring element in Putin's speeches is the strong reference to history. This is particularly clear in his remarks on Ukraine, for example in the Crimea speech from 2014 or in the detailed essay from 2021.<\/p>\n<p>Putin argues here with historical continuities, cultural interdependencies and political decisions of past decades. In these texts, Ukraine appears less as a clearly demarcated nation state of Western design and more as a historically evolved space with close ties to Russia.<\/p>\n<p>This view is controversial - and it clearly contradicts today's understanding of international law. Nevertheless, what follows from this is crucial: Putin uses history primarily to legitimize claims to influence, not to announce global expansion. His argument is backward-looking, not forward-looking. It explains why certain regions are considered particularly sensitive from a Russian perspective - but it does not automatically explain an urge to expand beyond these areas.<\/p>\n<h3>Security, not world domination<\/h3>\n<p>A central motif in almost all of Putin's security policy speeches is the issue of threat and security. He repeatedly refers to NATO's eastward expansion, military infrastructure close to the Russian border and what he sees as a breakdown in trust following the end of the Cold War.<\/p>\n<p>Regardless of how one evaluates this assessment, it follows a defensive logic. Putin regularly describes Russia as a reacting actor, not an initiating one. His speeches speak of encirclement, vulnerability and strategic imbalance - not of a desire for conquest or an ideological mission.<\/p>\n<p>This does not mean that this view is objectively correct. But it is consistent. And it is clearly different from the idea of a state actively working to break up foreign alliances or conquer new zones of influence.<\/p>\n<h3>Ukraine as a special case<\/h3>\n<p>Ukraine plays a special role in Putin's thinking. This is unmistakable. In several speeches and texts, he historically questions the independence of the Ukrainian state and criticizes its political orientation towards the West. This argument culminates in the recognition of the so-called People's Republics in 2022 and ultimately in military intervention.<\/p>\n<p>This is where the most problematic aspect of his politics becomes apparent: history becomes a justification for present-day violence. Nevertheless, differentiation is also necessary here. Ukraine is not treated by Putin as \u201ejust any neighboring country\u201c, but as an exception - as part of its own historical narrative. This is precisely what distinguishes this conflict from the frequently claimed general intention to expand into Europe.<\/p>\n<p>Anyone who automatically deduces Lithuania, Poland or Germany from Ukraine is skipping a decisive argumentative step.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-full wp-image-4896\" src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Putin.jpg\" alt=\"Statements by Putin\" width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Putin.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Putin-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Putin-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Putin-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Putin-18x12.jpg 18w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" \/><\/p>\n<h3>Putin's public statements vs. common Western narratives<\/h3>\n<div style=\"overflow-x: auto;\">\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr style=\"background-color: #f0f0f0;\">\n<th>Topic<\/th>\n<th>Putin's documented statements<\/th>\n<th>Frequent western narrative<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Soviet Union<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Disintegration as a geopolitical catastrophe due to social consequences<\/td>\n<td>Russia wants to restore the Soviet Union territorially<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>NATO countries<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>No interest in attacks on NATO members emphasized<\/td>\n<td>Russia plans attack on Baltic states or Poland<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Ukraine<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Special historical role, security and influence arguments<\/td>\n<td>Ukraine only the first step in a larger expansion<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Europe as a whole<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Cooperation possible in principle, interest in stable relationships<\/td>\n<td>Europe as Russia's next military target<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h2>Statements on NATO countries: Strikingly clear<\/h2>\n<p>It is remarkable how clearly Putin expresses himself with regard to NATO countries. In several interviews and speeches - especially since 2022 - he has emphasized that Russia has no interest in attacking countries such as Poland, the Baltic states or other NATO members. He points out the disproportionality of such a step and the global consequences that would result.<\/p>\n<p>These statements are often dismissed in the West as pure tactics or propaganda. But even if you distrust them, it remains to be said: There is no documented speech in which Putin explicitly announces or even holds out the prospect of Russia expanding into NATO territories.<\/p>\n<p>In view of the intensive media observation of Russian politics, this blank space is remarkable.<\/p>\n<h3>Between ideology and pragmatism<\/h3>\n<p>Putin's rhetoric is a mixture of ideological elements and sober power thinking. He speaks of history, identity and sovereignty - but also of costs, risks and global power relations. This second part in particular is often underestimated in the public perception.<\/p>\n<p>On economic issues, for example, Putin regularly emphasizes the need for stability, trade and international relations. In these passages, Russia does not present itself as an isolated bloc, but as part of a networked world - with clear interests, but without missionary pretensions.<\/p>\n<p>Again, this is not a moral judgment, but a description of one's own self-image.<\/p>\n<h3>What's missing: The big announcement<\/h3>\n<p>If you take all these speeches, texts and interviews together, one thing is particularly striking: the lack of a clear, offensive vision. There is no speech, no strategy paper, no programmatic statement in which Putin formulates a goal that even comes close to restoring the Soviet Union.<\/p>\n<p>Instead, terms such as security, stability, influence, respect and balance dominate. These are classic categories of geopolitical thinking - not the language of an expansionist worldview.<\/p>\n<p>This does not mean that Russian policy is harmless or does not pose risks. But it does mean that many of the common attributions are based less on what is said than on what is feared.<\/p>\n<p>There is a gap between these two levels - and it is precisely this gap that characterizes large parts of the current debate. In order to conduct this debate objectively, it is not enough to collect quotes. We must also ask what interests lie behind these statements - and what rational limits are placed on them. This is exactly what the next chapter is about.<\/p>\n<h3>When scenarios become legal consequences<\/h3>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/10\/what-does-the-tension-in-germany-mean-and-what-concrete-consequences-would-it-have\/\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-medium wp-image-3002\" src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Spannungsfall-Deutschland-2025-300x200.jpg\" alt=\"Tension case-Germany-2025\" width=\"300\" height=\"200\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Spannungsfall-Deutschland-2025-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Spannungsfall-Deutschland-2025-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Spannungsfall-Deutschland-2025-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Spannungsfall-Deutschland-2025.jpg 1536w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>Many security policy discussions remain abstract as long as they are conducted at the level of international signals and diplomatic assessments. But what actually happens when the situation escalates to such an extent that formal terms such as \u201ecase of tension\u201c suddenly take on a practical meaning? The article <a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/10\/what-does-the-tension-in-germany-mean-and-what-concrete-consequences-would-it-have\/\"><em><strong>\u201eWhat does the voltage drop in Germany mean - and what would the specific consequences be?\u201c<\/strong><\/em><\/a> in the magazine explains which constitutional mechanisms would then take effect, which responsibilities would change and what consequences this would have for the state, the economy and the population. Anyone wishing to take the foreign policy arguments of this article further will find the necessary legal and organizational classification there.<\/p>\n<h2>Russia, space and resources: does such a country need expansion?<\/h2>\n<p>When talking about Russian imperialism, it is easy to think that expansion is an internal compulsion - almost a historical regularity. But before making such assumptions, it is worth taking a sober look at the material foundations of the country itself.<\/p>\n<p>Because power politics is not only based on ideologies, but very often on very simple factors: space, population, resources.<\/p>\n<p>And here Russia occupies a special position.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-full wp-image-4897\" src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Russland-Groesse.jpg\" alt=\"Does a country like Russia need more land?\" width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Russland-Groesse.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Russland-Groesse-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Russland-Groesse-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Russland-Groesse-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Russland-Groesse-18x12.jpg 18w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" \/><\/p>\n<h3>A country of unusual size<\/h3>\n<p>Russia is the largest country in the world in terms of area. Its territory stretches across eleven time zones, from Central Europe to the Pacific. This geographical reality alone raises a fundamental question: Why would a country of this size need more territory?<\/p>\n<p>Historical wars of conquest often had very specific motives: lack of land, strategic bottlenecks, access to resources or sea routes. These factors only apply to Russia to a limited extent. The country has enormous land reserves - many of which are sparsely populated or barely developed. Expansion would not solve these structural challenges, but rather exacerbate them.<\/p>\n<h3>Abundant resources - the opposite of classic expansion logic<\/h3>\n<p>Russia also differs significantly from traditional expansionist powers when it comes to raw materials. Natural gas, crude oil, coal, metals, rare earths, wood, fresh water - hardly any other country is equipped to a comparable extent.<\/p>\n<p>Historically, resource deficits have been one of the strongest drivers of conquest policy. However, Russia does not suffer from a lack of resources, but from the task of developing, transporting and utilizing existing resources in an economically sensible way. This is a structural problem, not a territorial one.<\/p>\n<p>An attack on foreign states would not change this. On the contrary: it would further restrict access to markets, technology and investments - precisely those factors that are crucial for the use of these resources.<\/p>\n<h3>Demographics as a limiting factor<\/h3>\n<p>One point that is often underestimated is population development. Russia is not a young, dynamically growing country. The population is stagnating or shrinking in some areas, and entire regions are underpopulated. Even today, it is a challenge to maintain the infrastructure, administration and economy within the country.<\/p>\n<p>Territorial expansion does not just mean gaining land, but long-term commitment: administration, security, supply, integration. All of this requires people - permanently. This is not an attractive scenario for a country with demographic tensions.<\/p>\n<p>This reveals a fundamental contradiction in the common narrative: a state that is struggling to develop its existing territory in a stable manner gains little from additional areas with foreign populations and high political costs.<\/p>\n<h3>The difference between influence and ownership<\/h3>\n<p>An important analytical step is to distinguish between territorial expansion and political influence. States can attempt to exert influence without moving borders - economically, diplomatically, culturally or in terms of security policy.<\/p>\n<p>Many of Putin's statements are precisely about this: influence, security zones, political alignment of neighboring countries. This is not a morally unproblematic concern, but it is different from classic politics of conquest. Influence is reversible, possession is not. Influence can be negotiated, territory hardly ever.<\/p>\n<p>This is precisely why it is analytically inaccurate to automatically interpret every influence as a precursor to expansion.<\/p>\n<h3>Expansion as a cost trap<\/h3>\n<p>From a purely rational point of view, territorial expansion would be one thing above all for Russia: a cost trap. Militarily, economically and politically. Every additional square kilometer increases security costs, every new border creates new lines of conflict.<\/p>\n<p>For a country that is already confronted with sanctions, technological dependencies and a need for structural reform, such a strategy would be difficult to explain. It would tie up resources without creating any recognizable added value.<\/p>\n<p>This raises a simple but central question: what specific problem could Russia solve through expansion? This question usually remains unanswered in the public debate.<\/p>\n<h3>Historical analogies as a mental trap<\/h3>\n<p>Recourse to historical empires - tsarism, the Soviet Union - often seems convincing, but fails to recognize the changed framework conditions. The world of the 21st century is economically intertwined, technologically dependent and politically sensitive. Territory alone is no longer a guarantee of power.<\/p>\n<p>Anyone who measures today's politics against the standards of past centuries risks misinterpretations. History explains ways of thinking - but it is no substitute for analyzing current interests.<\/p>\n<p>The assumption that Russia is inevitably striving for expansion therefore often says more about Western expectations than about Russian reality. It ties in with familiar images, but largely ignores material, demographic and economic factors.<\/p>\n<p>This does not mean that Russian policy is harmless or purely defensive. It does mean, however, that expansion is not very plausible as a rational goal - at least if you look at it from a structural rather than an ideological perspective.<\/p>\n<p>The next chapter therefore deals with a point where this structural view becomes particularly clear: What would an attack on a NATO country actually trigger - and why is it considered highly unlikely, even from a strategic point of view?<\/p>\n<h3>Comparison of key figures for the EU and Russia<\/h3>\n<div style=\"overflow-x: auto;\">\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr style=\"background-color: #f0f0f0;\">\n<th>Key figure<\/th>\n<th>EU (27)<\/th>\n<th>Russia<\/th>\n<th>Status \/ Source<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Area (km\u00b2)<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>4.101.431<\/td>\n<td>17.098.246<\/td>\n<td>EU: Eurostat Databrowser (EU27_2020); RU: Country area (internationally recognized)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Population<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>449.2 million.<\/td>\n<td>143.5 million.<\/td>\n<td>EU: Eurostat (01.01.2024); RU: World Bank (2024)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Population density<\/strong> (Population\/km\u00b2)<\/td>\n<td>\u2248 109,5<\/td>\n<td>\u2248 8,4<\/td>\n<td>Calculated from area &amp; population (above)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Per capita area<\/strong> (m\u00b2 per person)<\/td>\n<td>\u2248 9.100<\/td>\n<td>\u2248 119.000<\/td>\n<td>Calculated (area\/population)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Natural gas reserves<\/strong> (proven)<\/td>\n<td>\u2248 0.4 trillion m\u00b3<\/td>\n<td>\u2248 37.4 trillion m\u00b3<\/td>\n<td>EU: Global Energy Monitor (end of 2020); RU: Energy Institute data (via Visual Capitalist, 2024)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Oil reserves<\/strong> (proven)<\/td>\n<td>very low (largest EU values in the low single-digit billion range overall)<\/td>\n<td>58 billion barrels<\/td>\n<td>EU: EIA country data (aggregated only weakly); RU: U.S. EIA Country Analysis Brief (as of 01.01.2024)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Coal production<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>45 million tons (hard coal, 2024)<\/td>\n<td>(high, several 100 million tons\/year)<\/td>\n<td>EU: Eurostat (2024 hard coal production); RU: EIA country profile (coal production, 2023\/2024)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h2>NATO standby and escalation: what would happen in reality<\/h2>\n<p>Hardly any other term is used so frequently in the current debate - and so rarely thought through in concrete terms - as the NATO stand-off. The mere mention of a possible Russian attack on a NATO country is often enough to conjure up the idea of an imminent war throughout Europe. But it is precisely here that it is worth taking a closer look at processes, interests and the logic of military escalation.<\/p>\n<p>Because an attack on a NATO member would not be an isolated event. It would be a breach of the system.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-full wp-image-4898\" src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Nato-Debatten.jpg\" alt=\"NATO assistance and debates\" width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Nato-Debatten.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Nato-Debatten-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Nato-Debatten-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Nato-Debatten-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Nato-Debatten-18x12.jpg 18w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" \/><\/p>\n<h3>Article 5: No automatism, but a clear threshold<\/h3>\n<p>The core of the NATO alliance is Article 5: the principle of collective defense. An attack on one member state is considered an attack on all. This mechanism is often understood as a kind of military reflex - attack equals counterattack.<\/p>\n<p>It is not as simple as that. Article 5 does not oblige the Member States to take specific military action, but to provide support \u201eby such means as they consider necessary\u201c. This leaves political leeway. But this leeway ends at a clear threshold: a deliberate attack on a NATO country would inevitably trigger a massive response.<\/p>\n<p>Not because everyone involved wants war, but because otherwise the alliance will lose its basis for existence.<\/p>\n<h3>Chains of escalation instead of regional conflicts<\/h3>\n<p>A NATO stand-off would not be a regionally limited conflict like many wars in recent decades. It would immediately activate several levels of escalation:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>military<\/strong>Mobilization, troop deployments, airspace security<\/li>\n<li><strong>political<\/strong>Crisis summits, ultimatums, diplomatic bloc formation<\/li>\n<li><strong>strategic<\/strong>Deterrence signals, including nuclear dimension<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>This chain alone makes it clear why such a step would be almost impossible for Russia to calculate. Escalation cannot be precisely controlled. It creates dynamics that are beyond the control of individual actors.<\/p>\n<p>It is precisely states that think strategically that avoid such situations - not for moral reasons, but out of self-interest.<\/p>\n<h3>The role of the USA: uncertain guarantor, but still central<\/h3>\n<p>A common argument at the moment is that the USA is increasingly withdrawing from Europe, is tired of war, is blocked domestically or is strategically focused on the Indo-Pacific. None of this is entirely wrong. Washington is openly discussing burden-sharing, European ownership and priorities.<\/p>\n<p>But to conclude from this that the USA would ignore an attack on a NATO country is not enough. Such an attack would massively damage the credibility of the USA as a global leader. Not just in Europe, but worldwide. Alliances only work if there are guarantees. For this very reason, it would be strategically inconceivable for Washington to remain inactive in the event of a stand-off - even if the long-term aim is to achieve greater European independence.<\/p>\n<p>Withdrawal from NATO is a political debate. Breaking a promise of mutual assistance would be a geopolitical turning point.<\/p>\n<h3>European debates as an expression of uncertainty - not weakness<\/h3>\n<p>The current discussions in Europe about its own nuclear umbrella, strategic autonomy or defense unions are often interpreted as evidence of a crumbling NATO. In fact, they reflect something else: uncertainty about long-term dependencies.<\/p>\n<p>Europe is trying to create options - not because the NATO status quo is considered worthless, but because political landscapes are changing. These debates are an expression of precaution, not disintegration.<\/p>\n<p>For Russia, this means that although the European security architecture is changing, it is by no means incapable of acting. An attack would not be met with an uncoordinated, hesitant Europe, but with an alliance system that is more likely to come together under pressure than fall apart.<\/p>\n<h3>Military reality instead of political fantasy<\/h3>\n<p>It is often suggested that Russia can \u201etest\u201c how far it can go - for example by launching a limited attack on a small NATO country. This idea underestimates the military reality. Every military step is visible, assessable and politically charged. There is no risk-free test balloon.<\/p>\n<p>Even a limited attack would trigger a massive deployment of troops, including US units. The escalation threshold would be exceeded, with no guarantee that the conflict could be recaptured.<\/p>\n<p>From a military point of view, this is not a game, but a high-risk scenario.<\/p>\n<h3>Nuclear deterrence: the unspoken foundation<\/h3>\n<p>As unpleasant as the topic is, it is part of reality: NATO is a nuclear-secured alliance. So is Russia. It is precisely this mutual deterrence that has prevented conflicts between major powers from escalating directly in the past.<\/p>\n<p>A direct military conflict between Russia and NATO would inevitably touch on the nuclear dimension - not necessarily in the sense of a deployment, but as a strategic background. This fact alone has a stabilizing effect, not an escalating one.<\/p>\n<p>No rational player can take such a risk lightly.<\/p>\n<h3>Why the NATO attack is so implausible as a scenario<\/h3>\n<p>If you put all these factors together, a clear picture emerges:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>A NATO attack would be extremely costly politically, militarily and economically<\/li>\n<li>It would not offer any clear strategic benefit<\/li>\n<li>It would trigger chains of escalation that are almost impossible to control<\/li>\n<li>It would provoke a massive backlash even if the US role were to falter<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>This does not make the scenario impossible - but highly illogical. This is precisely why it is problematic when it is presented as almost self-evident in the public debate. Those who constantly argue with the worst-case scenario narrow the view and make sober politics more difficult.<\/p>\n<h3>Fear is no substitute for analysis<\/h3>\n<p>The idea that Russia is on the verge of attacking NATO countries is based less on concrete signs than on uncertainty, historical reflexes and political rhetoric. It works because it has emotional appeal - not because it is strategically compelling.<\/p>\n<p>This makes it all the more important to distinguish between real risks and political dramatization. The next chapter therefore deals with the question that has always remained unanswered:<\/p>\n<p>What advantages would Russia actually gain from such a step - and why are the costs against it?<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h3>Current survey on trust in politics<\/h3>\n<div class='bootstrap-yop yop-poll-mc'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"basic-yop-poll-container\" style=\"background-color:#ffffff; border:0px; border-style:solid; border-color:#000000; border-radius:5px; padding:0px 5px;\" data-id=\"1\" data-temp=\"basic-pretty\" data-skin=\"square\" data-cscheme=\"blue\" data-cap=\"0\" data-access=\"guest\" data-tid=\"\" data-uid=\"9f4e92d5d4d6aca2f0c7a15173352e83\" data-pid=\"3521\" data-resdet=\"votes-number,percentages\" data-show-results-to=\"guest\" data-show-results-moment=\"after-vote\" data-show-results-only=\"false\" data-show-message=\"true\" data-show-results-as=\"bar\" data-sort-results-by=\"as-defined\" data-sort-results-rule=\"asc\"data-is-ended=\"0\" data-percentages-decimals=\"2\" data-gdpr=\"no\" data-gdpr-sol=\"consent\" data-css=\"\" data-counter=\"0\" data-load-with=\"1\" data-notification-section=\"top\"><div class=\"row\"><div class=\"col-md-12\"><div class=\"basic-inner\"><div class=\"basic-message hide\" style=\"border-left: 10px solid #008000; padding: 0px 10px;\" data-error=\"#ff0000\" data-success=\"#008000\"><p class=\"basic-message-text\" style=\"color:#000000; font-size:14px; font-weight:normal;\"><\/p><\/div><div class=\"basic-overlay hide\"><div class=\"basic-vote-options\"><\/div><div class=\"basic-preloader\"><div class=\"basic-windows8\"><div class=\"basic-wBall basic-wBall_1\"><div class=\"basic-wInnerBall\"><\/div><\/div><div class=\"basic-wBall basic-wBall_2\"><div class=\"basic-wInnerBall\"><\/div><\/div><div class=\"basic-wBall basic-wBall_3\"><div class=\"basic-wInnerBall\"><\/div><\/div><div class=\"basic-wBall basic-wBall_4\"><div class=\"basic-wInnerBall\"><\/div><\/div><div class=\"basic-wBall basic-wBall_5\"><div class=\"basic-wInnerBall\"><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><form class=\"basic-form\" action=\"\"><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"_token\" value=\"38a8dc4430\" autocomplete=\"off\"><div class=\"basic-elements\"><div class=\"basic-element basic-question basic-question-text-vertical\" data-id=\"1\" data-uid=\"027699c2d4f5d641d5f964da5cf017a3\" data-type=\"question\" data-question-type=\"text\" data-required=\"yes\" data-allow-multiple=\"no\" data-min=\"1\" data-max=\"1\" data-display=\"vertical\" data-colnum=\"\" data-display-others=\"no\" data-others-color=\"\" data-others=\"\" data-others-max-chars=\"0\"><div class=\"basic-question-title\"><h5 style=\"color:#000000; font-size:16px; font-weight:normal; text-align:left;\">How much trust do you have in politics and the media in Germany?<\/h5><\/div><ul class=\"basic-answers\"><li class=\"basic-answer\" style=\"padding:0px 0px;\" data-id=\"1\" data-type=\"text\" data-vn=\"10\" data-color=\"#000000\" data-make-link=\"no\" data-link=\"\"><div class=\"basic-answer-content basic-text-vertical\"><label for=\"answer[1]\" class=\"basic-answer-label\"><input type=\"radio\" id=\"answer[1]\" name=\"answer[1]\" value=\"1\"><span class=\"basic-text\" style=\"color: #000000; font-size: 14px; font-weight: normal;\">Very high - I fully trust the official bodies<\/span><\/label><\/div><\/li><li class=\"basic-answer\" style=\"padding:0px 0px;\" data-id=\"2\" data-type=\"text\" data-vn=\"21\" data-color=\"#000000\" data-make-link=\"no\" data-link=\"\"><div class=\"basic-answer-content basic-text-vertical\"><label for=\"answer[2]\" class=\"basic-answer-label\"><input type=\"radio\" id=\"answer[2]\" name=\"answer[1]\" value=\"2\"><span class=\"basic-text\" style=\"color: #000000; font-size: 14px; font-weight: normal;\">Medium - I am cautious, but not fundamentally suspicious<\/span><\/label><\/div><\/li><li class=\"basic-answer\" style=\"padding:0px 0px;\" data-id=\"3\" data-type=\"text\" data-vn=\"51\" data-color=\"#000000\" data-make-link=\"no\" data-link=\"\"><div class=\"basic-answer-content basic-text-vertical\"><label for=\"answer[3]\" class=\"basic-answer-label\"><input type=\"radio\" id=\"answer[3]\" name=\"answer[1]\" value=\"3\"><span class=\"basic-text\" style=\"color: #000000; font-size: 14px; font-weight: normal;\">Low - I check a lot of things myself<\/span><\/label><\/div><\/li><li class=\"basic-answer\" style=\"padding:0px 0px;\" data-id=\"4\" data-type=\"text\" data-vn=\"247\" data-color=\"#000000\" data-make-link=\"no\" data-link=\"\"><div class=\"basic-answer-content basic-text-vertical\"><label for=\"answer[4]\" class=\"basic-answer-label\"><input type=\"radio\" id=\"answer[4]\" name=\"answer[1]\" value=\"4\"><span class=\"basic-text\" style=\"color: #000000; font-size: 14px; font-weight: normal;\">Hardly present - I believe that a lot of things are disguised or staged<\/span><\/label><\/div><\/li><\/ul><\/div><div class=\"clearfix\"><\/div><\/div><div class=\"basic-vote\"><a href=\"#\" class=\"button basic-vote-button\" role=\"button\" style=\"background:#027bb8; border:0px; border-style: solid; border-color:#1636f0; border-radius:5px; padding:10px 10px; color:#ffffff; font-size:14px; font-weight:normal;\">Vote<\/a><\/div><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"trp-form-language\" value=\"en\"\/><\/form><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n<hr \/>\n<h2>Costs instead of slogans: What Russia would lose in the process<\/h2>\n<p>In political debates, people often talk about intentions, less often about consequences. Especially when it comes to war scenarios, buzzwords and moral certainties dominate. However, states do not act according to slogans - at least in the long term - but according to cost-benefit considerations. It is therefore worth asking a sober question at this point: what would Russia realistically have to lose if it were to take the path of further escalation up to and including an attack on NATO countries?<\/p>\n<p>The answer is clear - and it explains much of what is often ignored in the public debate.<\/p>\n<h3>Economic isolation: today's level would be harmless in comparison<\/h3>\n<p>Russia is already facing far-reaching sanctions. Nevertheless, it remains economically capable of acting, not least due to its exports of raw materials, alternative sales markets and its own industrial capacities. It is precisely this remaining room for maneuver that would almost completely disappear in the event of a direct confrontation with NATO.<\/p>\n<p>An attack on a NATO country would not mean a gradual escalation, but a qualitative leap: complete economic isolation, massive secondary sanctions, the severing of almost all remaining trade relations with the West - and considerable pressure on countries that have so far adopted a more neutral position.<\/p>\n<p>For a country that is rich in raw materials but technologically dependent on cooperation, this would be a serious blow. Modern industry, energy infrastructure, transportation, communication - all of these depend on international networking. War would not strengthen these networks, but destroy them.<\/p>\n<h3>Military overstretch instead of strategic strength<\/h3>\n<p>In military terms, such a step would present Russia with enormous challenges. The war in Ukraine is already tying up considerable resources - in terms of personnel, material and logistics. An additional conflict with a highly armed alliance would multiply this burden.<\/p>\n<p>This is not just about weapons and troops, but about long-term capability. Military power does not develop in individual strikes, but over time. Supply, maintenance, training, replacement - all this costs money, people and political stability.<\/p>\n<p>A large-scale conflict with NATO would force Russia to maintain its military presence on numerous fronts simultaneously. This is not a demonstration of power, but a classic risk of overextension.<\/p>\n<h3>Domestic political stability as an underestimated factor<\/h3>\n<p>Wars are not only decided on the frontlines, but also within a country. Economic burdens, losses, insecurity - all of these have an impact on societies. Russia is not a cohesive unit without internal tensions. Regions, elites and economic interests differ greatly.<\/p>\n<p>An escalating war would exacerbate these tensions. It would divert resources away from domestic political development, intensify social conflicts and put pressure on the legitimacy of state action. Authoritarian systems in particular depend on stability - not on permanent exceptional situations.<\/p>\n<p>From this perspective, restraint is not a weakness, but a form of self-preservation.<\/p>\n<h3>International position: from player to problem case<\/h3>\n<p>Russia sees itself as a global power, as an independent player between East and West, as a voice in a multipolar world. However, this role requires the ability to act - diplomatically, economically and politically.<\/p>\n<p>A direct conflict with NATO would shift Russia into a different category: from a shaping actor to a permanent trouble spot. Many countries that currently maintain a certain distance from Western sanctions policy would have to reposition themselves. Neutrality becomes more difficult when fronts are clearly drawn.<\/p>\n<p>For countries that depend on stability in the international system, permanent escalation is not an attractive partner status.<\/p>\n<h3>The loss of negotiating leeway<\/h3>\n<p>One aspect that is often overlooked is the loss of political flexibility. As long as conflicts remain limited, there is room for negotiation - even if it is small. With each stage of escalation, these spaces shrink.<\/p>\n<p>An attack on a NATO country would not only push Russia into a corner militarily, but also diplomatically. Withdrawals would become more difficult, loss of face more likely, compromises politically more risky. This is precisely why strategically-minded players avoid steps from which there is no orderly return.<\/p>\n<h3>No recognizable profits<\/h3>\n<p>If you compare all these losses with possible gains, the balance sheet remains surprisingly empty. Territorial gains? Hardly politically tenable. Economic advantages? Not recognizable. Strategic security? Rather the opposite.<\/p>\n<p>What remains is a hypothetical demonstration of power - but power that cannot be translated into stability is short-term and expensive. States that think long-term avoid such strategies.<\/p>\n<h3>Rationality instead of demonization<\/h3>\n<p>None of this means that Russian politics is free of mistakes, risks or problematic decisions. But it does mean that its actions cannot be meaningfully explained if rationality is completely ignored.<\/p>\n<p>Thinking of Russia exclusively as an irrational aggressor explains fears - but not policy. Those who look at costs, interests and borders, on the other hand, arrive at a more differentiated picture.<\/p>\n<p>And it is precisely this picture that is necessary in order to pose the next question in a meaningful way: If escalation is so expensive - why is there nevertheless so much talk of offers of talks, negotiations and even economic cooperation? This is the subject of the next chapter.<\/p>\n<h3>Military debates and their social consequences<\/h3>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/09\/conscientious-objection-to-military-service-what-to-do-in-an-emergency\/\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-medium wp-image-2969\" src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/wehrpflicht-kriegsdienst-verweigern-300x200.jpg\" alt=\"Conscription: refuse military service\" width=\"300\" height=\"200\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/wehrpflicht-kriegsdienst-verweigern-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/wehrpflicht-kriegsdienst-verweigern-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/wehrpflicht-kriegsdienst-verweigern-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/wehrpflicht-kriegsdienst-verweigern.jpg 1536w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>Questions about deterrence, loyalty to the alliance and strategic stability quickly seem far removed from everyday life. Nevertheless, they can have a direct impact on citizens - for example, when there is renewed discussion about forms of service or possible compulsory military service. In the article <a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/09\/conscientious-objection-to-military-service-what-to-do-in-an-emergency\/\"><em><strong>\u201eFitness for war, conscription &amp; refusal: what to do in an emergency\u201c<\/strong><\/em><\/a> the magazine sheds light on historical experiences, the models being discussed and how politicians are attempting to respond to changing security policy conditions. The article helps to understand why international developments always result in domestic policy decisions.<\/p>\n<h2>Negotiation offers, talks and gas: the often overlooked level<\/h2>\n<p>In the public perception, the war in Ukraine often appears as a series of military escalations, interrupted by brief phases of rhetorical calm. What is easily overlooked is a second level that has existed in parallel and still exists today: the level of offers of talks, negotiation formats and economic signals. It fits poorly into clear friend-foe schemes - and is therefore often only mentioned in passing.<\/p>\n<p>A sober look at this level is important, not to relativize anything, but to get a more complete picture.<\/p>\n<h3>Offer to resume gas deliveries<\/h3>\n<p>At the international Valdai Discussion Forum in Sochi, Russian President Vladimir Putin renewed his offer to supply natural gas to Germany via the remaining intact section of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Russia is prepared to transport up to 27 billion cubic meters a year, he said, but the decision lies with the German government. If you would like to know more about the current situation of Germany's gas supply, you can find relevant information in the article <a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/declining-gas-storage-in-germany-technical-limits-and-political-consequences\/\"><em><strong>\u201eSinking gas storage facilities in Germany: technology, limits and political consequences\u201c<\/strong><\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n<div class=\"lyte-wrapper\" style=\"width:640px;max-width:100%;margin:5px;\"><div class=\"lyMe\" id=\"WYL_J0LsBg-i4tw\"><div id=\"lyte_J0LsBg-i4tw\" data-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/plugins\/wp-youtube-lyte\/lyteCache.php?origThumbUrl=%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FJ0LsBg-i4tw%2Fhqdefault.jpg\" class=\"pL\"><div class=\"tC\"><div class=\"tT\"><\/div><\/div><div class=\"play\"><\/div><div class=\"ctrl\"><div class=\"Lctrl\"><\/div><div class=\"Rctrl\"><\/div><\/div><\/div><noscript><a href=\"https:\/\/youtu.be\/J0LsBg-i4tw\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/plugins\/wp-youtube-lyte\/lyteCache.php?origThumbUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FJ0LsBg-i4tw%2F0.jpg\" alt=\"YouTube video thumbnail\" width=\"640\" height=\"340\" \/><br \/>Watch this video on YouTube<\/a><\/noscript><\/div><\/div><div class=\"lL\" style=\"max-width:100%;width:640px;margin:5px;\"><\/div><br \/>\nNORDSTREAM 2: Vladimir Putin offers Germany new gas supplies |\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/@WELTVideoTV\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">WORLD<\/a><\/p>\n<p>At the same time, Putin once again spoke of an \u201eact of international terrorism\u201c in connection with the destruction of the remaining pipelines and referred to different, sometimes contradictory investigation results. He also pointed out that gas continues to flow through Ukraine to Europe and that both sides benefit economically from the transit.<\/p>\n<h3>Background and unanswered questions about Nord Stream<\/h3>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/north-stream-blasting-sabotage-power-politics-and-the-uncomfortable-open-questions\/\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright wp-image-4445 size-medium\" src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/nordstream-sprengung-300x200.jpg\" alt=\"Nord Stream blasting\" width=\"300\" height=\"200\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/nordstream-sprengung-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/nordstream-sprengung-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/nordstream-sprengung-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/nordstream-sprengung-18x12.jpg 18w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/nordstream-sprengung.jpg 1536w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>The debate about Nord Stream is about much more than just energy policy. In my detailed <a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/north-stream-blasting-sabotage-power-politics-and-the-uncomfortable-open-questions\/\"><strong>Background article on the pipeline<\/strong><\/a> the origins, economic significance, geopolitical interests and consequences of the demolition are analyzed in detail. It deals with security of supply, dependencies, political decisions in Berlin and Brussels and the question of which scenarios appear realistic for Europe's energy market. The article collects available facts, presents different perspectives and helps to better place current statements in the wider context of recent years.<\/p>\n<h3>Early talks: more than just symbolic contacts<\/h3>\n<p>Shortly after the start of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022, direct talks were held between Russian and Ukrainian delegations. These initially took place in Belarus and later in various formats, including in Istanbul. These were not merely polite contacts, but structured negotiations with concrete draft texts.<\/p>\n<p>Issues discussed included neutrality, security guarantees, territorial status issues and international integration. It is undisputed that these talks ultimately failed. However, it is equally undisputed that they existed - and were considered a serious option at times.<\/p>\n<p>It is important to differentiate here: a willingness to talk does not mean a willingness to reach an agreement. Both sides entered these rounds with clear, sometimes irreconcilable core demands. The military course, political dynamics and international influencing factors contributed to a rapid narrowing of the scope for negotiation.<\/p>\n<h3>Why negotiations do not automatically mean peace<\/h3>\n<p>In many debates, it is implicitly assumed that those who offer talks want peace - and those who reject them want escalation. This equation is too simple. Negotiations are an instrument, not a goal. They can be used to buy time, test positions or send international signals.<\/p>\n<p>Russia has repeatedly stated that it is willing to negotiate - but always under conditions that, from Russia's perspective, should reflect security interests or territorial realities. Ukraine, on the other hand, has made it clear that it cannot accept any agreements that permanently call its sovereignty or territorial integrity into question.<\/p>\n<p>Both positions are understandable in themselves - and therefore difficult to reconcile. Anyone who ignores this complexity reduces the conflict to moral slogans and fails to recognize the structural blockages.<\/p>\n<h3>Talks after 2022: rhetoric or a real option?<\/h3>\n<p>Even after the early rounds of negotiations broke off, the Russian leadership repeatedly stated publicly that it was ready for talks - in some cases explicitly with European players or the USA. These statements were often dismissed in the West as pure rhetoric, an attempt to create division or shift responsibility.<\/p>\n<p>But even if one shares this skepticism, it remains to be said: The offer of talks is part of Russia's communication strategy. It is not only aimed at Ukraine, but also at international observers, neutral states and the European public.<\/p>\n<p>That alone does not make it credible - but it does make it relevant for an analysis that considers not only military movements, but also diplomatic signals.<\/p>\n<h3>Energy as a political signal<\/h3>\n<p>This dual level became particularly clear in the area of energy policy. Despite massive political tensions and sanctions, Russia repeatedly emphasized its fundamental willingness to supply natural gas to Europe - even after the acts of sabotage on the Nord Stream pipelines.<\/p>\n<p>From a Russian perspective, this was more than just an economic offer. Energy was long regarded as a connecting element between Russia and Europe, a symbol of mutual dependence and stability. The adherence to supply options - even in a very limited form - was therefore also a political signal: cooperation would be technically possible if the political will existed.<\/p>\n<p>However, this signal was deliberately not taken up on the European side. There were many reasons for this: fundamental political decisions, legal issues, security policy reassessments and the desire to permanently reduce dependencies. This rejection was just as real as the offer itself.<\/p>\n<p>The decisive factor here is not who was \u201eright\u201c, but that both levels existed in parallel: the offer and the conscious decision not to accept it.<\/p>\n<h3>Why this level is often ignored<\/h3>\n<p>The reasons why negotiation and cooperation signals are often underrepresented in the public debate are obvious. They disrupt clear narratives. They make conflicts more complicated, less morally unambiguous and more difficult to communicate.<\/p>\n<p>A war is easier to explain if it appears as unstoppable aggression. Offers of talks fit poorly into this picture, especially if they do not lead to results. They seem like noise in a narrative that relies on determination and perseverance.<\/p>\n<p>But precisely here lies an analytical problem: those who only look at military escalation overlook political movements.<\/p>\n<h3>Negotiation offers and discussion formats since 2022<\/h3>\n<div style=\"overflow-x: auto;\">\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr style=\"background-color: #f0f0f0;\">\n<th>Period<\/th>\n<th>Offer \/ Format<\/th>\n<th>Russian position<\/th>\n<th>Result \/ Reaction<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>February-March 2022<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Direct talks (Belarus)<\/td>\n<td>Willingness to negotiate on neutrality and security guarantees<\/td>\n<td>Talks without conclusion, military situation changed dynamics<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>March-April 2022<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Negotiations in Istanbul<\/td>\n<td>Neutral status of Ukraine, security guarantees, open territorial issues<\/td>\n<td>No agreement, negotiations later broken off<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>2023-2024<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Public discussion offers<\/td>\n<td>Willingness to talk \u201eon the basis of real circumstances\u201c<\/td>\n<td>Ukraine and the West consider it unacceptable<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>2024-2025<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Signals towards Europe \/ USA<\/td>\n<td>Readiness for dialog also emphasized with Western players<\/td>\n<td>No new formal negotiation formats<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3>Energy and gas offers vs. political decisions<\/h3>\n<div style=\"overflow-x: auto;\">\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr style=\"background-color: #f0f0f0;\">\n<th>Period<\/th>\n<th>Russian signal<\/th>\n<th>European reaction<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Fall 2022<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Reference to usable Nord Stream 2 pipeline<\/td>\n<td>Political rejection, certification suspended<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>2023<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Renewed statement on delivery capability via remaining line<\/td>\n<td>No utilization, focus on diversification<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>2024-2025<\/strong><\/td>\n<td>Fundamental readiness to deliver emphasized<\/td>\n<td>Strategic exit from Russian gas confirmed<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<h3>Offers are not proof of a desire for peace<\/h3>\n<p>At the same time, it would be equally short-sighted to automatically infer a desire for peace from offers of talks or energy. Offers can be tactically motivated, aimed at gaining time or influencing international perception. They can be meant seriously - or instrumentally. A serious analysis can withstand this ambivalence. It names offers without idealizing them. It describes rejections without moralizing them.<\/p>\n<p>The existence of these signals of negotiation and cooperation shows one thing above all: the conflict is not one-dimensional. It is not just a military clash, but a complex web of security interests, political communication, economic dependencies and historical interpretations.<\/p>\n<p>Anyone who wants to understand why certain narratives take hold - and why others are ignored - cannot avoid this level. It explains why the conflict does not simply fit into the categories of \u201eunavoidable\u201c or \u201ewithout alternative\u201c.<\/p>\n<p>And it prepares the ground for the next question: Why do certain narratives persist so tenaciously despite this - and who do they benefit politically? This is the subject of the following chapter.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n\n\t\t\t<div class=\"display-post-types\">\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<style type=\"text\/css\">\n\t\t\t#dpt-wrapper-826 { --dpt-text-align: left;--dpt-image-crop: center;--dpt-border-radius: 5px;--dpt-h-gutter: 10px;--dpt-v-gutter: 10px; }\t\t\t<\/style>\n\t\t\t<style type=\"text\/css\">#dpt-wrapper-826 { --dpt-title-font-style:normal;--dpt-title-font-weight:600;--dpt-title-line-height:1.5;--dpt-title-text-decoration:none;--dpt-title-text-transform:none;--dpt-excerpt-font-style:normal;--dpt-excerpt-font-weight:400;--dpt-excerpt-line-height:1.5;--dpt-excerpt-text-decoration:none;--dpt-excerpt-text-transform:none;--dpt-meta1-font-style:normal;--dpt-meta1-font-weight:400;--dpt-meta1-line-height:1.9;--dpt-meta1-text-decoration:none;--dpt-meta1-text-transform:none;--dpt-meta2-font-style:normal;--dpt-meta2-font-weight:400;--dpt-meta2-line-height:1.9;--dpt-meta2-text-decoration:none;--dpt-meta2-text-transform:none; }<\/style><div class=\"dpt-main-header\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-main-title\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class=\"dpt-main-title-text\">Current articles on Germany<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t<div id=\"dpt-wrapper-826\" class=\"dpt-wrapper dpt-list2 land1 dpt-cropped dpt-flex-wrap\" >\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"helge schneider: haltung, humor und die freiheit, sich nicht erkl\u00e4ren zu m\u00fcssen\" data-id=\"4756\"  data-category=\"allgemein gesellschaft kunst &amp; kultur\" data-post_tag=\"deutschland erfahrungen meinungsfreiheit musik portrait\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/02\/helge-schneider-attitude-humor-and-the-freedom-not-to-have-to-explain-yourself\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Helge Schneider: Attitude, humor and the freedom of not having to explain yourself<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"Helge Schneider Portrait\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Helge-Schneider.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Helge-Schneider.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Helge-Schneider-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Helge-Schneider-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Helge-Schneider-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Helge-Schneider-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/02\/helge-schneider-attitude-humor-and-the-freedom-not-to-have-to-explain-yourself\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">Helge Schneider: Attitude, humor and the freedom of not having to explain yourself<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"energie, macht und abh\u00e4ngigkeit: europas weg vom exportweltmeister zum nachfrager\" data-id=\"4945\"  data-category=\"allgemein featured gesellschaft\" data-post_tag=\"denkmodelle deutschland energiepolitik eu-gesetze europa geopolitik krisen meinungsfreiheit sicherheitspolitik\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/02\/energy-power-and-dependence-europes-transition-from-world-export-champion-to-consumer\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Energy, power and dependency: Europe's path from world export champion to consumer<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"Europe and energy\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Europa-Energie.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Europa-Energie.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Europa-Energie-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Europa-Energie-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Europa-Energie-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Europa-Energie-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/02\/energy-power-and-dependence-europes-transition-from-world-export-champion-to-consumer\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">Energy, power and dependency: Europe's path from world export champion to consumer<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"was unsere opas vom krieg erz\u00e4hlten \u2013 und warum diese stimmen heute fehlen\" data-id=\"4674\"  data-category=\"allgemein gesellschaft\" data-post_tag=\"deutschland erfahrungen europa geopolitik krisen meinungsfreiheit musik sicherheitspolitik\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/what-our-grandfathers-told-us-about-the-war-and-why-these-voices-are-missing-today\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">What our grandfathers told us about the war - and why these voices are missing today<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"War memories of the grandfathers\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Opa-Kriegserinnerungen.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Opa-Kriegserinnerungen.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Opa-Kriegserinnerungen-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Opa-Kriegserinnerungen-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Opa-Kriegserinnerungen-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Opa-Kriegserinnerungen-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/what-our-grandfathers-told-us-about-the-war-and-why-these-voices-are-missing-today\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">What our grandfathers told us about the war - and why these voices are missing today<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"dieter bohlen im klartext: warum deutschland an der eigenen b\u00fcrokratie scheitert\" data-id=\"3546\"  data-category=\"allgemein b\u00fccher gesellschaft kunst &amp; kultur\" data-post_tag=\"buch deutschland erfahrungen krisen meinungsfreiheit musik\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/11\/dieter-bohlen-in-plain-language-why-germany-is-failing-because-of-its-own-bureaucracy\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Dieter Bohlen in plain language: Why Germany is failing because of its own bureaucracy<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"Dieter Bohlen in conversation with Dominik Kettner\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/bohlen-kettner-germany.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/bohlen-kettner-germany.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/bohlen-kettner-germany-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/bohlen-kettner-germany-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/bohlen-kettner-germany-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/bohlen-kettner-germany-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/11\/dieter-bohlen-in-plain-language-why-germany-is-failing-because-of-its-own-bureaucracy\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">Dieter Bohlen in plain language: Why Germany is failing because of its own bureaucracy<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\n<hr \/>\n<h2>Why these narratives are so effective - and who benefits from them<\/h2>\n<p>Now that statements, interests, costs and alternatives have been considered, one question remains that is crucial to the overall understanding: Why do certain narratives persist so tenaciously, even though they only have limited support when examined closely?<\/p>\n<p>The answer lies less in individual facts than in the function of narratives themselves. They structure reality, simplify complexity and provide orientation - especially in uncertain times.<\/p>\n<h3>Fear as a political amplifier<\/h3>\n<p>Narratives that work with existential threats have a special effect. They generate attention, focus emotions and shorten decision-making processes. Fear is not a coincidence, but an effective political factor.<\/p>\n<p>The idea of an imminent Russian attack on Europe ties in with deeply rooted historical memories. It activates collective protective reflexes and moral certainties. In such a climate, contradiction is quickly understood as trivialization, differentiation as risk.<\/p>\n<p>This can be useful for political actors. Complex security policy decisions are easier to communicate if they appear to have no alternative. Keeping the worst-case scenario constantly present reduces the demand for nuances.<\/p>\n<h3>Media logic: simplification instead of classification<\/h3>\n<p>The media also contribute to the stability of such narratives - not necessarily out of malicious intent, but for structural reasons. Complexity is difficult to communicate, especially under time pressure. Clear contrasts, personalized threats and recognizable patterns are easier to communicate.<\/p>\n<p>The narrative of \u201eimperial Russia\u201c offers exactly that: a familiar framework, clear roles and an intuitive dramaturgy. It allows different events - from troop movements to diplomatic statements - to be brought together under a common umbrella of interpretation.<\/p>\n<p>What gets lost in the process is the inner contradictions of political reality. But these contradictions are more difficult to narrate than a consistent threat picture.<\/p>\n<h3>Security policy and legitimacy<\/h3>\n<p>Narratives also fulfil a legitimizing function. Rearmament, budget decisions, strategic realignments - all of these require public acceptance. The greater the perceived threat, the lower the need for explanation.<\/p>\n<p>This does not mean that security policy measures are fundamentally wrong or unnecessary. However, it does mean that their justification is often less differentiated than the actual situation would allow.<\/p>\n<p>A permanent threat narrative creates scope for action - and excludes others at the same time.<\/p>\n<h3>Moral clarity as a substitute for analysis<\/h3>\n<p>Another aspect is of a moral nature. Narratives not only provide orientation, but also self-assurance. Those who believe they are on the \u201eright side\u201c need to ask fewer questions, weigh things up less and doubt less.<\/p>\n<p>This moral clarity is particularly attractive in times of conflict. It takes the pressure off. It replaces analysis with attitude. But this is precisely where the danger lies: moral certainty can lead to uncomfortable facts being ignored or dismissed as irrelevant.<\/p>\n<p>A conflict is then no longer understood, but evaluated. This may be emotionally satisfying, but is of little help in solving complex problems.<\/p>\n<h3>The function of repetition<\/h3>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/propaganda-history-methods-modern-forms-and-how-to-recognize-them\/\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright wp-image-4233 size-medium\" src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Propaganda-titel-300x200.jpg\" alt=\"What is propaganda?\" width=\"300\" height=\"200\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Propaganda-titel-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Propaganda-titel-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Propaganda-titel-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Propaganda-titel-18x12.jpg 18w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Propaganda-titel.jpg 1536w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px\" \/><\/a>Narratives are consolidated through repetition. The more often certain statements appear in a slightly varied form, the more natural they seem. At some point, they are no longer questioned, but taken for granted.<\/p>\n<p>This creates an interpretative framework in which divergent assessments need to be explained - not the narrative itself. Anyone who asks why Russia should attack a NATO country comes under pressure to justify themselves. Those who do not ask the question are considered realistic.<\/p>\n<p>This reversal of the burden of proof is a typical feature of stable narratives. If you would like to find out more about repetition and propaganda, you can find more detailed information in the article \u201e<a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/propaganda-history-methods-modern-forms-and-how-to-recognize-them\/\"><em><strong>Propaganda - history, methods, modern forms, and how to recognize them<\/strong><\/em><\/a>\u201c.<\/p>\n<h3>Simplification as a risk<\/h3>\n<p>The problem with such stories is not that they are completely made up out of thin air. It lies in the fact that they want to explain too much - and in doing so, ignore the essentials. They reduce actors to roles, motives to buzzwords, the future to scenarios.<\/p>\n<p>In security policy, this can be risky. Misperceptions, misunderstandings and overreactions often arise where complexity is underestimated.<\/p>\n<p>A sober view of narratives is therefore not an end in itself, but a contribution to stability.<\/p>\n<h3>Between vigilance and projection<\/h3>\n<p>Vigilance towards authoritarian states is justified. Projections are not. The difference lies in the willingness to examine assumptions - even if they seem familiar.<\/p>\n<p>Narratives are not wrong per se. But they are tools. And tools should be used consciously, not as an unnoticed substitute for analysis.<\/p>\n<h3>Why this classification is necessary<\/h3>\n<p>This chapter does not seek to impute any motives or delegitimize any actors. It merely aims to show that political reality consists not only of facts, but also of stories about facts.<\/p>\n<p>Those who recognize these narratives gain distance. And this distance is a prerequisite for discernment.<\/p>\n<p>The next chapter is therefore about bringing together the observations made so far - not to create a new narrative, but to create a viable interim balance between skepticism and naivety.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h3>Current survey on a possible case of tension in Germany<\/h3>\n<div class='bootstrap-yop yop-poll-mc'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"basic-yop-poll-container\" style=\"background-color:#ffffff; border:0px; border-style:solid; border-color:#000000; border-radius:5px; padding:0px 5px;\" data-id=\"6\" data-temp=\"basic-pretty\" data-skin=\"square\" data-cscheme=\"blue\" data-cap=\"0\" data-access=\"guest\" data-tid=\"\" data-uid=\"a22161ac0044d9a68e9ef54342c287a9\" data-pid=\"3546\" data-resdet=\"votes-number,percentages\" data-show-results-to=\"guest\" data-show-results-moment=\"after-vote\" data-show-results-only=\"false\" data-show-message=\"true\" data-show-results-as=\"bar\" data-sort-results-by=\"as-defined\" data-sort-results-rule=\"asc\"data-is-ended=\"0\" data-percentages-decimals=\"2\" data-gdpr=\"no\" data-gdpr-sol=\"consent\" data-css=\".basic-yop-poll-container[data-uid] .basic-vote {\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttext-align: center;\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\" data-counter=\"0\" data-load-with=\"1\" data-notification-section=\"top\"><div class=\"row\"><div class=\"col-md-12\"><div class=\"basic-inner\"><div class=\"basic-message hide\" style=\"border-left: 10px solid #008000; padding: 0px 10px;\" data-error=\"#ff0000\" data-success=\"#008000\"><p class=\"basic-message-text\" style=\"color:#000000; font-size:14px; font-weight:normal;\"><\/p><\/div><div class=\"basic-overlay hide\"><div class=\"basic-vote-options\"><\/div><div class=\"basic-preloader\"><div class=\"basic-windows8\"><div class=\"basic-wBall basic-wBall_1\"><div class=\"basic-wInnerBall\"><\/div><\/div><div class=\"basic-wBall basic-wBall_2\"><div class=\"basic-wInnerBall\"><\/div><\/div><div class=\"basic-wBall basic-wBall_3\"><div class=\"basic-wInnerBall\"><\/div><\/div><div class=\"basic-wBall basic-wBall_4\"><div class=\"basic-wInnerBall\"><\/div><\/div><div class=\"basic-wBall basic-wBall_5\"><div class=\"basic-wInnerBall\"><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><form class=\"basic-form\" action=\"\"><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"_token\" value=\"3b53f3a5e3\" autocomplete=\"off\"><div class=\"basic-elements\"><div class=\"basic-element basic-question basic-question-text-vertical\" data-id=\"6\" data-uid=\"e53830b98a59438e251ef339fdae32ce\" data-type=\"question\" data-question-type=\"text\" data-required=\"yes\" data-allow-multiple=\"no\" data-min=\"1\" data-max=\"7\" data-display=\"vertical\" data-colnum=\"\" data-display-others=\"no\" data-others-color=\"\" data-others=\"\" data-others-max-chars=\"0\"><div class=\"basic-question-title\"><h5 style=\"color:#000000; font-size:16px; font-weight:normal; text-align:left;\">How well do you personally feel prepared for a possible case of tension (e.g. crisis or war)?<\/h5><\/div><ul class=\"basic-answers\"><li class=\"basic-answer\" style=\"padding:0px 0px;\" data-id=\"24\" data-type=\"text\" data-vn=\"19\" data-color=\"#000000\" data-make-link=\"no\" data-link=\"\"><div class=\"basic-answer-content basic-text-vertical\"><label for=\"answer[24]\" class=\"basic-answer-label\"><input type=\"radio\" id=\"answer[24]\" name=\"answer[6]\" value=\"24\"><span class=\"basic-text\" style=\"color: #000000; font-size: 14px; font-weight: normal;\">Very good - I have supplies, knowledge and a plan<\/span><\/label><\/div><\/li><li class=\"basic-answer\" style=\"padding:0px 0px;\" data-id=\"25\" data-type=\"text\" data-vn=\"34\" data-color=\"#000000\" data-make-link=\"no\" data-link=\"\"><div class=\"basic-answer-content basic-text-vertical\"><label for=\"answer[25]\" class=\"basic-answer-label\"><input type=\"radio\" id=\"answer[25]\" name=\"answer[6]\" value=\"25\"><span class=\"basic-text\" style=\"color: #000000; font-size: 14px; font-weight: normal;\">Rather good - I have given it some thought<\/span><\/label><\/div><\/li><li class=\"basic-answer\" style=\"padding:0px 0px;\" data-id=\"26\" data-type=\"text\" data-vn=\"56\" data-color=\"#000000\" data-make-link=\"no\" data-link=\"\"><div class=\"basic-answer-content basic-text-vertical\"><label for=\"answer[26]\" class=\"basic-answer-label\"><input type=\"radio\" id=\"answer[26]\" name=\"answer[6]\" value=\"26\"><span class=\"basic-text\" style=\"color: #000000; font-size: 14px; font-weight: normal;\">Hardly - I just hope that nothing happens<\/span><\/label><\/div><\/li><li class=\"basic-answer\" style=\"padding:0px 0px;\" data-id=\"27\" data-type=\"text\" data-vn=\"13\" data-color=\"#000000\" data-make-link=\"no\" data-link=\"\"><div class=\"basic-answer-content basic-text-vertical\"><label for=\"answer[27]\" class=\"basic-answer-label\"><input type=\"radio\" id=\"answer[27]\" name=\"answer[6]\" value=\"27\"><span class=\"basic-text\" style=\"color: #000000; font-size: 14px; font-weight: normal;\">Not at all - I deliberately suppress the topic<\/span><\/label><\/div><\/li><li class=\"basic-answer\" style=\"padding:0px 0px;\" data-id=\"28\" data-type=\"text\" data-vn=\"12\" data-color=\"#000000\" data-make-link=\"no\" data-link=\"\"><div class=\"basic-answer-content basic-text-vertical\"><label for=\"answer[28]\" class=\"basic-answer-label\"><input type=\"radio\" id=\"answer[28]\" name=\"answer[6]\" value=\"28\"><span class=\"basic-text\" style=\"color: #000000; font-size: 14px; font-weight: normal;\">What is a \"voltage drop\" anyway?<\/span><\/label><\/div><\/li><\/ul><\/div><div class=\"clearfix\"><\/div><\/div><div class=\"basic-vote\"><a href=\"#\" class=\"button basic-vote-button\" role=\"button\" style=\"background:#027bb8; border:0px; border-style: solid; border-color:#000000; border-radius:5px; padding:10px 10px; color:#ffffff; font-size:14px; font-weight:normal;\">Vote<\/a><\/div><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"trp-form-language\" value=\"en\"\/><\/form><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n<hr \/>\n<h2>Between skepticism and naivety: what we can conclude from this<\/h2>\n<p>After considering statements, interests, costs, escalation logics and political narratives, the question inevitably arises as to what follows from this. Not in the sense of a simple answer, but in the sense of a resilient stance. After all, it is particularly tempting in complex conflicts to settle for either moral certainty or cynical indifference.<\/p>\n<p>Both fall short.<\/p>\n<p>A serious conclusion moves between these poles: between skepticism and naivety.<\/p>\n<h3>Skepticism is not mistrust of everything<\/h3>\n<p>Skepticism does not mean questioning everything in principle or considering every statement to be propaganda. It means examining assertions, considering contexts and enduring contradictions. Skepticism is not only directed outwards, but also inwards - towards one's own assumptions, assumptions and habits of thought.<\/p>\n<p>In relation to Russia, this means that neither every Russian statement has to be taken as true nor every Western interpretation as self-evident. We can acknowledge that Russian policy is interest-driven - and at the same time recognize that many of the common attributions about its goals are analytically weak.<\/p>\n<h3>Skepticism protects against exaggeration, not responsibility.<\/h3>\n<p>Naivety manifests itself less in credulity than in simplification. Anyone who believes that international politics follows clear moral lines is underestimating reality. States do not act like people, they do not react in a linear fashion and they rarely pursue a single goal.<\/p>\n<p>It is not na\u00efve to believe in negotiations. It is na\u00efve to see them as a simple solution. It is equally na\u00efve to interpret every security measure as a provocation or every escalation as inevitable.<\/p>\n<p>This is precisely why it is important not to go to the opposite extreme: Criticism of alarmist narratives must not lead to the trivialization of real conflicts.<\/p>\n<h3>What Russia should not be accused of<\/h3>\n<p>A clear line can be drawn from the previous chapters. There is no reliable evidence that Russia is pursuing a large-scale plan for military expansion into NATO territories or that it wants to restore the Soviet Union in a territorial sense. This assumption is often repeated, but rarely substantiated.<\/p>\n<p>Nor can a rational interest in such a step be derived from Putin's speeches or from the Russian cost-benefit situation. The risks far outweigh the potential gains.<\/p>\n<p>This statement is not an exoneration of Russian policy - it is an analytical classification.<\/p>\n<h3>What Russia must nevertheless be trusted with<\/h3>\n<p>At the same time, it would be dishonest to infer a general lack of danger from this classification. Russia is pursuing clearly defined interests, particularly in its immediate environment. It is prepared to assert these interests by force if it considers them to be existential.<\/p>\n<p>This applies above all to questions of zones of influence, security architecture and the political orientation of neighboring states. This attitude is problematic, conflict-prone and highly risky for the countries concerned.<\/p>\n<h3>Skepticism also means not ignoring this side.<\/h3>\n<p>A central analytical point of this article is the distinction between influence and expansion. Influence can be exercised politically, economically or militarily without moving borders. Expansion, on the other hand, means permanent territorial change with all the resulting obligations.<\/p>\n<p>Many misunderstandings arise because these levels are mixed up. Those who automatically interpret any exertion of influence as a precursor to expansion inevitably reach alarmist conclusions. Conversely, those who ignore claims to influence fail to recognize the real causes of conflict.<\/p>\n<p>Serious analysis consistently observes this distinction.<\/p>\n<h3>Why differentiation is not a luxury<\/h3>\n<p>In heated debates, differentiation is often seen as a weakness. However, in foreign and security policy, it is a prerequisite for the ability to act. Misperceptions are dangerous - not only because they encourage wrong decisions, but also because they can reinforce escalation dynamics.<\/p>\n<p>An opponent who is perceived exclusively as an irrational aggressor leaves little room for de-escalation. At the same time, rationality must not be confused with harmlessness.<\/p>\n<p>This balance is uncomfortable - but necessary.<\/p>\n<h3>What follows from this - very practical<\/h3>\n<p>A serious conclusion from the previous chapters is therefore:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Vigilance makes sense, alarmism does not.<\/li>\n<li>Deterrence can stabilize, dramatization cannot.<\/li>\n<li>Negotiations are not a sign of weakness, but they are also no guarantee of peace.<\/li>\n<li>Narratives can provide orientation - but must not replace analysis.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>This attitude is less spectacular than clear slogans. It is harder to tweet, harder to chant and harder to moralize. But it is more sustainable.<\/p>\n<h3>A plea for mental discipline<\/h3>\n<p>Between skepticism and naivety lies something that has become rare in political debates: intellectual discipline. The willingness not to be driven by fear. The ability to see several levels at the same time. And the courage to question simple narratives without committing oneself to a counter-narrative.<\/p>\n<p>With this attitude, not only this conflict can be better understood - but political reality as a whole. The concluding chapter is therefore not about a conclusion in the traditional sense, but rather a calm summary of the central ideas: why more thinking and fewer headlines are necessary right now.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright size-full wp-image-4899\" src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Kohl-Gorbatschow.jpg\" alt=\"Intellectual discipline and diplomacy\" width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Kohl-Gorbatschow.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Kohl-Gorbatschow-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Kohl-Gorbatschow-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Kohl-Gorbatschow-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/NATO-Russland-Kohl-Gorbatschow-18x12.jpg 18w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" \/><\/p>\n<h2>More thinking, fewer headlines: A cautious outlook<\/h2>\n<p>There is no final verdict at the end of this article. The world is too complex, politics too multi-layered and human actions too contradictory for that. What remains is more of an attitude - or perhaps better: a hope.<\/p>\n<p>The hope that political debates will once again be based more on facts than on narratives. That statements are not believed because they are often repeated, but because they are verifiable. And that skepticism is not seen as a threat, but as a necessary part of responsible thinking.<\/p>\n<h3>Narratives are convenient - reality is exhausting<\/h3>\n<p>Narratives have one advantage: they are simple. They organize the world into clear categories, provide unambiguous assignments of blame and convey a sense of orientation. They are particularly seductive in times of uncertainty. They reduce complexity and provide emotional relief.<\/p>\n<p>But this is precisely where the danger lies. Those who rely too much on narratives forget how to ask questions. Those who confuse headlines with reality lose sight of the bigger picture. And those who base political decisions solely on fear do not increase security, but insecurity.<\/p>\n<p>A safe world is not created through permanent alertness, but through a sober assessment of risks - and of limits.<\/p>\n<h3>Facts do not create certainty, but stability<\/h3>\n<p>Facts are often inconvenient. They rarely provide clear heroes and villains, rarely simple solutions. They force us to endure contradictions and accept ambivalence. But they have a decisive advantage: they limit misinterpretations.<\/p>\n<p>This limitation is crucial in international politics. Misunderstandings, misjudgements and projections are among the most common causes of escalation. The more clearly actors assess each other, the lower the probability of unintended conflicts.<br \/>\nFacts do not create harmony. But they do create predictability.<\/p>\n<h3>Safety begins with thinking<\/h3>\n<p>Security policy is often understood as a military or technical issue. But it starts much earlier - in the way we think. In the way threats are described, how interests are interpreted and how language is used.<\/p>\n<p>If every scenario is immediately escalated to the maximum, there is no room for nuance. If any differentiation is seen as a weakness, the quality of decisions decreases. And when narratives replace analysis, politics loses its ability to steer.<\/p>\n<p>A safe world therefore requires not only defense, but also mental discipline.<\/p>\n<h3>The role of the public<\/h3>\n<p>The public also bears responsibility - not in the sense of guilt, but in the sense of impact. Media consumption, political discussions and social networks reinforce certain interpretations and suppress others. The louder a narrative is, the harder it is to perceive quieter arguments.<\/p>\n<p>But the public sphere is not a static space. It changes with the questions that are asked - and with those that must not be asked. Those who are prepared to question narratives without reflexively adopting counter-narratives contribute to a more stable culture of debate.<\/p>\n<p>This is not a retreat from a political stance. It is its prerequisite.<\/p>\n<h3>A modest wish<\/h3>\n<p>Perhaps it is naive to hope that facts will permanently prevail over narratives. Narratives will probably always remain part of political debates. But it is not na\u00efve to wish that they alone do not determine how we see the world.<\/p>\n<p>If this article makes a small contribution to clarifying terms, confusing habits of thought and strengthening the willingness to take a closer look, then it will have fulfilled its purpose. Not because it provides answers - but because it keeps questions open.<\/p>\n<p>A safe world is not created by constantly expecting the worst. It is created by taking reality seriously - in all its complexity. Less headlines, more thinking. Less certainty, more scrutiny.<\/p>\n<p>Perhaps that is not a spectacular claim. But it is a viable one.<\/p>\n<p>And sometimes that is exactly enough.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h2>Sources and background information on the topic<\/h2>\n<ol>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/transcripts\/22931\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Kremlin.ru - Annual Address to the Federal Assembly (25.04.2005)<\/a><\/strong>Official transcript of the speech, in which Putin describes the collapse of the Soviet Union as \u201e(one of) the greatest geopolitical catastrophes\u201c of the 20th century, referring in particular to the social, demographic and governmental consequences for Russia and Russians outside the Russian Federation.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/irp.fas.org\/news\/2005\/04\/putin042505.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">FAS \/ IRP - English translation of Putin 2005 State of the Nation Address<\/a><\/strong>: Secondary source that documents an English translation\/adoption of the 2005 speech and makes the famous \u201egeopolitical catastrophe\u201c passage easy to find.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/news\/20603\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Kremlin.ru - Address by President of the Russian Federation (18.03.2014, \u201eCrimea speech\u201c)<\/a><\/strong>Official transcript of the speech on the admission of Crimea.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/news\/20607\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Kremlin.ru - Meeting in support of Crimea's accession (18.03.2014)<\/a><\/strong>Supplementary primary source from the same day (public speech\/event).<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/news\/66181\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Kremlin.ru - Article by Vladimir Putin \u201eOn the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians\u201c (12.07.2021)<\/a><\/strong>Primary source for Putin's historical line of interpretation on Russia\/Ukraine. Relevance: Many Western interpretations of Russian target images refer to this argumentation structure; here it is fully documented in the original context.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.osw.waw.pl\/en\/publikacje\/analyses\/2021-07-13\/putins-article-historical-unity-russians-and-ukrainians\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">OSW (Centre for Eastern Studies) - Analysis of Putin's essay (13.07.2021)<\/a><\/strong>: Professional classification of the 2021 essay by an established Eastern Europe think tank.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/news\/67828\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Kremlin.ru - Address by the President of the Russian Federation (21.02.2022)<\/a><\/strong>Primary source immediately before the recognition of the Donetsk\/Luhansk \u201ePeople's Republics\u201c. Important because many justifications in the debate (NATO, security architecture, history) are based on this speech.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/news\/67843\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Kremlin.ru - Address by the President of the Russian Federation (24.02.2022)<\/a><\/strong>Primary source for the justification of the attack of 24.02.2022. Relevance: What was claimed as the objectives and how the leadership justified the operation can be read in full here.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/docs.un.org\/en\/S\/2022\/154\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">United Nations - Document S\/2022\/154 (24.02.2022)<\/a><\/strong>UN documentation that lists Putin's speech of 24.02.2022 as an attachment\/reference.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/about-us\/official-texts-and-resources\/official-texts\/1949\/04\/04\/the-north-atlantic-treaty\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">NATO - The North Atlantic Treaty (Official Text)<\/a><\/strong>Official treaty text, basis for Article 5\/6 and the legal classification of what an \u201earmed attack\u201c means and what obligation arises from it (including the wording \u201esuch action as it deems necessary\u201c).<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/what-we-do\/introduction-to-nato\/collective-defence-and-article-5\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">NATO - Collective defense and Article 5 (Declaration, updated)<\/a><\/strong>NATO background page that summarizes Article 5 in an understandable way, provides context and explains the functional logic (assistance yes, but type\/scope to be determined politically). Well suited for readers who do not want to read treaty German\/treaty English.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.europarl.europa.eu\/RegData\/etudes\/ATAG\/2022\/739250\/EPRS_ATA%282022%29739250_EN.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">European Parliament (EPRS) - Briefing on NATO Art. 5 and EU Art. 42(7)<\/a><\/strong>Compact comparison of the collective assistance clauses of NATO and the EU. Useful for a clear legal\/conceptual explanation of the differences between NATO assistance and EU assistance.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/russias-putin-we-have-no-interest-invading-poland-or-latvia-2024-02-08\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Reuters - Putin: \u201eno interest\u201c in invading Poland\/Latvia (08.02.2024)<\/a><\/strong>: News report with central, frequently quoted statement from the Carlson interview in which Putin denies an attack on NATO countries.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/putin-tells-pilots-f16s-can-carry-nuclear-weapons-they-wont-change-things-2024-03-27\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Reuters - Putin: Russia will not attack NATO; F-16 context (27.03.2024)<\/a><\/strong>Report on Putin's statements to air force pilots, including escalation logic (F-16, possible target definition for take-offs from third countries). Relevance: simultaneously shows appeasement (\u201eno attack on NATO\u201c) and threatening\/deterrent rhetoric in the Ukraine context.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/what-happened-last-time-russia-ukraine-held-peace-talks-2025-05-12\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Reuters - Overview: What happened at the last direct peace talks in 2022? (12.05.2025)<\/a><\/strong>Structured summary of the Belarus\/Istanbul talks 2022, including key points of the drafts and contentious issues (neutrality, guarantees, troop strength, Crimea issue).<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/russia-ukraine-talk-about-peace-are-still-far-apart-2025-06-02\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Reuters - Report on later rounds of talks\/positions (03.06.2025)<\/a><\/strong>Reuters report on renewed direct contacts and great distance between positions, including presentation of Russian demands and political tensions over negotiation formats.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/putin-germany-unlikely-accept-gas-via-remaining-nord-stream-2-pipeline-2022-10-14\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Reuters - Putin: Offer gas via intact Nord Stream 2 pipeline; Germany rejects (14.10.2022)<\/a><\/strong>: Concrete, dated Reuters evidence for the debate about the remaining intact NS2 tube and the political non-acceptance.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/markets\/putin-russia-can-still-supply-gas-via-nord-stream-2-as-one-line-intact-idUSS8N3A2079\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Reuters - Putin: Russia can continue to supply gas via NS2 (05.10.2023)<\/a><\/strong>: Reuters message documenting the repeated signal (\u201eready to deliver\u201c, one line intact).<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/gas-pipeline-nord-streams-long-way-back-europe-2025-03-07\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Reuters - Explainer: Nord Stream, damage, hurdles, political context (07.03.2025)<\/a><\/strong>Background piece on the condition of the pipelines and political\/technical hurdles to a return.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/kremlin-says-intact-section-nord-stream-gas-pipelines-could-be-quickly-activated-2025-09-26\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Reuters - Kremlin: intact Nord Stream section could be activated quickly (26.09.2025)<\/a><\/strong>: Later Reuters evidence that the Russian side continues to publicly emphasize the \u201ereactivability\u201c. Relevance: shows continuity of signaling over the years.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bruegel.org\/analysis\/end-russian-gas-transit-ukraine-and-options-eu\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Bruegel - Analysis on Russian gas\/transit and EU options (17.10.2024)<\/a><\/strong>European think tank paper on the gas situation, transit via Ukraine and strategic options. Useful for understanding why Europe is structurally committed to diversification - regardless of individual political statements.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/trump-if-nato-members-dont-pay-us-wont-defend-them-2025-03-07\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Reuters - Trump: USA would not defend non-payers (07.03.2025)<\/a><\/strong>: Reuters report as evidence of the \u201eUS uncertainty factor\u201c that has intensified debates in Europe about self-reliance and nuclear shielding.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/republicans-blast-trump-over-threat-abandon-nato-allies-2024-02-12\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Reuters - Reactions to Trump's NATO remarks (12.02.2024)<\/a><\/strong>: Contextual evidence that the debate on US reliability is not just a European interpretation, but was controversial in domestic politics in the USA itself.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/crs-product\/LSB11256\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">U.S. Congress (CRS) - North Atlantic Treaty: Legal Obligations &amp; Congressional Authority (Legal Sidebar)<\/a><\/strong>Legal classification from a US congressional perspective, including a discussion of the legal hurdles against a unilateral withdrawal from NATO (keyword: Section 1250A).<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/merz-says-germany-exploring-shared-nuclear-umbrella-with-european-allies-2026-01-29\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Reuters - Merz: Talks on European nuclear umbrella (29.01.2026)<\/a><\/strong>: Reuters evidence for the current European debate on nuclear deterrence\/protective shield as a reaction to transatlantic insecurity.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/frances-macron-address-nation-late-wednesday-2025-03-05\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Reuters - Macron opens debate on extending French nuclear shield (05.03.2025)<\/a><\/strong>Reuters source documenting the French position (willingness to talk, but national control)<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.tagesspiegel.de\/politik\/joschka-fischer-uber-die-neue-weltlage-als-junger-mann-wurde-ich-mich-freiwillig-zum-wehrdienst-melden-15191494.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Tagesspiegel - Interview with Joschka Fischer on the new world situation (29.01.2026)<\/a><\/strong>Primary media source for Fischer's statement that Europe must think about nuclear deterrence\/\u201eEuropean nuclear bomb\u201c, based on uncertainty about the US guarantee of protection.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.stern.de\/news\/ex-aussenminister-joschka-fischer-plaediert-fuer-atomare-aufruestung-europas-37086690.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Stern - Summary\/news on the Fischer initiative (29.01.2026)<\/a><\/strong>Secondary report that briefly discusses Fischer's position and can serve as an additional reference alongside the original interview.<\/li>\n<li><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/germanys-merz-says-eu-willing-talk-russia-will-not-hold-parallel-talks-2026-02-06\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Reuters - Merz: EU willing to talk in principle, but no \u201eparallel channels\u201c (06.02.2026)<\/a><\/strong>: Current Reuters evidence that \u201edialog\u201c is publicly mentioned as an option, but at the same time should remain politically controlled and coordinated.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<hr \/>\n\n\t\t\t<div class=\"display-post-types\">\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<style type=\"text\/css\">\n\t\t\t#dpt-wrapper-827 { --dpt-text-align: left;--dpt-image-crop: center;--dpt-border-radius: 5px;--dpt-h-gutter: 10px;--dpt-v-gutter: 9px; }\t\t\t<\/style>\n\t\t\t<style type=\"text\/css\">#dpt-wrapper-827 { --dpt-title-font-style:normal;--dpt-title-font-weight:600;--dpt-title-line-height:1.5;--dpt-title-text-decoration:none;--dpt-title-text-transform:none;--dpt-excerpt-font-style:normal;--dpt-excerpt-font-weight:400;--dpt-excerpt-line-height:1.5;--dpt-excerpt-text-decoration:none;--dpt-excerpt-text-transform:none;--dpt-meta1-font-style:normal;--dpt-meta1-font-weight:400;--dpt-meta1-line-height:1.9;--dpt-meta1-text-decoration:none;--dpt-meta1-text-transform:none;--dpt-meta2-font-style:normal;--dpt-meta2-font-weight:400;--dpt-meta2-line-height:1.9;--dpt-meta2-text-decoration:none;--dpt-meta2-text-transform:none; }<\/style><div class=\"dpt-main-header\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-main-title\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class=\"dpt-main-title-text\">Current articles on art &amp; culture<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t<div id=\"dpt-wrapper-827\" class=\"dpt-wrapper dpt-mag1 land1 dpt-cropped dpt-flex-wrap\" >\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"dieter hallervorden \u2013 mehr als didi: portr\u00e4t eines unbequemen freigeists\" data-id=\"4347\"  data-category=\"gesellschaft kunst &amp; kultur stories &amp; humor\" data-post_tag=\"erfahrungen meinungsfreiheit musik portrait\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/dieter-hallervorden-more-than-didi-portrait-of-an-uncomfortable-free-spirit\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Dieter Hallervorden - More than Didi: Portrait of an uncomfortable free spirit<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"Dieter Hallervorden and the W\u00fchlm\u00e4use in Berlin\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Dieter-Hallvervorden-Wuehlmaeuse.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Dieter-Hallvervorden-Wuehlmaeuse.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Dieter-Hallvervorden-Wuehlmaeuse-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Dieter-Hallvervorden-Wuehlmaeuse-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Dieter-Hallvervorden-Wuehlmaeuse-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Dieter-Hallvervorden-Wuehlmaeuse-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/dieter-hallervorden-more-than-didi-portrait-of-an-uncomfortable-free-spirit\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">Dieter Hallervorden - More than Didi: Portrait of an uncomfortable free spirit<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"helge schneider: haltung, humor und die freiheit, sich nicht erkl\u00e4ren zu m\u00fcssen\" data-id=\"4756\"  data-category=\"allgemein gesellschaft kunst &amp; kultur\" data-post_tag=\"deutschland erfahrungen meinungsfreiheit musik portrait\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/02\/helge-schneider-attitude-humor-and-the-freedom-not-to-have-to-explain-yourself\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Helge Schneider: Attitude, humor and the freedom of not having to explain yourself<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"Helge Schneider Portrait\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Helge-Schneider.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Helge-Schneider.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Helge-Schneider-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Helge-Schneider-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Helge-Schneider-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Helge-Schneider-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/02\/helge-schneider-attitude-humor-and-the-freedom-not-to-have-to-explain-yourself\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">Helge Schneider: Attitude, humor and the freedom of not having to explain yourself<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"ulrike gu\u00e9rot: eine europ\u00e4erin zwischen idee, universit\u00e4t und \u00f6ffentlichem diskurs\" data-id=\"4039\"  data-category=\"allgemein gesellschaft kunst &amp; kultur\" data-post_tag=\"denkmodelle deutschland europa geopolitik krisen meinungsfreiheit portrait sicherheitspolitik spieltheorie\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/12\/ulrike-guerot-a-european-between-the-idea-of-university-and-public-discourse\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Ulrike Gu\u00e9rot: A European between idea, university and public discourse<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"Ulrike Gu\u00e9rot and Europe\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ulrike-guerot-portrait.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ulrike-guerot-portrait.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ulrike-guerot-portrait-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ulrike-guerot-portrait-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ulrike-guerot-portrait-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ulrike-guerot-portrait-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/12\/ulrike-guerot-a-european-between-the-idea-of-university-and-public-discourse\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">Ulrike Gu\u00e9rot: A European between idea, university and public discourse<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"gr\u00f6nland, trump und die frage der zugeh\u00f6rigkeit: geschichte, recht und realit\u00e4t\" data-id=\"4325\"  data-category=\"allgemein gesellschaft kunst &amp; kultur\" data-post_tag=\"europa geopolitik krisen meinungsfreiheit sicherheitspolitik\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/groenland-trump-and-the-question-of-belonging-history-law-and-reality\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Greenland, Trump and the question of belonging: history, law and reality<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"Greenland in the crosshairs: USA and Trump\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Groenland-USA-Trump-Titel.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Groenland-USA-Trump-Titel.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Groenland-USA-Trump-Titel-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Groenland-USA-Trump-Titel-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Groenland-USA-Trump-Titel-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/Groenland-USA-Trump-Titel-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2026\/01\/groenland-trump-and-the-question-of-belonging-history-law-and-reality\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">Greenland, Trump and the question of belonging: history, law and reality<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\n<hr \/>\n<h2>Frequently asked questions<\/h2>\n<ol>\n<li><strong>Is this article intended to justify or defend Russian policy?<\/strong><br \/>\nNo. The article explicitly does not aim to defend or justify Russian policy. Rather, it attempts to separate assertions, narratives and attributions from verifiable statements and comprehensible interests. Criticism of Russian actions remains possible and necessary - but here it is placed on an analytical basis rather than on moral assumptions.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Why is so much emphasis placed on what Putin actually said?<\/strong><br \/>\nBecause political assessments are only viable if they are based on verifiable statements. In the public debate, Putin's goals are often interpreted, exaggerated or derived from individual quotes. This article aims to show that there is often a large gap between interpretation and verifiable statements - and that this gap is relevant for political decisions.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Does that mean we should simply believe Russian statements?<\/strong><br \/>\nNo. Statements by state leaders are always guided by interests. The article does not advocate good faith, but classification. Between blind trust and blanket rejection, there is a space in which statements can be examined, contextualized and compared with actions.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Why does the Soviet Union still play such an important role in today's debate?<\/strong><br \/>\nBecause it was anchored in the West for decades as a central threat. This historical image of terror continues to have an effect today and shapes, often unconsciously, the perception of Russia. The article shows that this imprint says more about Western habits of thought than about concrete Russian plans in the 21st century.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Can Russia's actions in Ukraine really not be transferred to Europe?<\/strong><br \/>\nThe article argues that an automatic transfer is not analytically sound. Ukraine has a special role in Russian policy, which is justified historically, culturally and strategically - regardless of how one evaluates this justification. Deriving a plan of attack against NATO states directly from this skips several necessary intermediate steps.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Why would an attack on a NATO country be so illogical for Russia?<\/strong><br \/>\nBecause such an attack would cause massive military, economic and political costs without bringing any recognizable strategic gain. It would trigger chains of escalation that would be almost impossible to control and drastically restrict Russia's international scope for action.<\/li>\n<li><strong>But isn't deterrence still necessary?<\/strong><br \/>\nYes, the article does not question deterrence. However, it distinguishes between deterrence and alarmism. Deterrence is based on clarity and predictability. Alarmism, on the other hand, can reinforce misperceptions and distort political reactions.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Why does the article emphasize costs and losses so strongly?<\/strong><br \/>\nBecause rational actors - especially states - do not act against their own structural interests in the long term. If you want to understand what is likely, you have to ask what an actor would gain or lose. Moral categories alone do not explain geopolitical decisions.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Are Russia's negotiation offers serious or just tactics?<\/strong><br \/>\nBoth are possible. The article makes it clear that offers of talks neither automatically prove a desire for peace nor are they meaningless. They are part of political communication and must be classified as such - without idealizing them or devaluing them across the board.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Why is the energy issue dealt with in such detail?<\/strong><br \/>\nBecause energy was a central link between Russia and Europe for years. The fact that gas supplies were discussed even after the start of the war shows that the economic and political levels were not completely decoupled. This fact fits poorly into simple war narratives, but is analytically relevant.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Why are narratives presented as so problematic?<\/strong><br \/>\nNarratives are not wrong per se, but they simplify reality. They become problematic when they replace analysis. In security policy, this can be dangerous because it encourages misperceptions and overreactions.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Isn't it dangerous to question narratives while a war is going on?<\/strong><br \/>\nIt is not the questioning that is dangerous, but the uncritical acceptance. Mental discipline is particularly important in times of crisis. Differentiation does not mean trivializing conflicts, but understanding them better.<\/li>\n<li><strong>What does \u201ebetween skepticism and naivety\u201c mean in concrete terms?<\/strong><br \/>\nIt means neither believing everything nor rejecting everything. Skepticism tests, naivety simplifies. A serious attitude endures contradictions, accepts uncertainty and avoids jumping to conclusions.<\/li>\n<li><strong>What role does the European debate on its own nuclear umbrella play?<\/strong><br \/>\nIt shows uncertainty about long-term dependencies, not necessarily the disintegration of NATO. The article classifies this debate as a precautionary measure - not as evidence of an immediate threat or weakness.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Can we derive specific policy recommendations from this article?<\/strong><br \/>\nThis article is not intended as a political program. It aims to provide a basis for thought, not instructions for action. Its recommendation is more methodical: take a closer look, make a clear distinction, react less emotionally.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Why is so much emphasis placed on sound and language?<\/strong><br \/>\nBecause language shapes reality. Terms such as \u201eunavoidable\u201c, \u201eno alternative\u201c or \u201eimminent attack\u201c influence perception and decisions. The article attempts to use language that explains rather than escalates.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Isn't this approach too sober for such an emotional time?<\/strong><br \/>\nPerhaps. But that is precisely why it is necessary. Emotions are understandable, but they are no substitute for analysis. Sobriety is not a lack of compassion, but a prerequisite for responsible politics.<\/li>\n<li><strong>What should I as a reader take away from this article at the end?<\/strong><br \/>\nNot a new certainty, but more discernment. The ability to recognize narratives, classify facts and distinguish between justified concern and exaggerated fear. If this succeeds, the article will have achieved its goal.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<hr \/>\n\n\t\t\t<div class=\"display-post-types\">\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<style type=\"text\/css\">\n\t\t\t#dpt-wrapper-828 { --dpt-text-align: left;--dpt-image-crop: center;--dpt-border-radius: 5px;--dpt-h-gutter: 10px;--dpt-v-gutter: 9px; }\t\t\t<\/style>\n\t\t\t<style type=\"text\/css\">#dpt-wrapper-828 { --dpt-title-font-style:normal;--dpt-title-font-weight:600;--dpt-title-line-height:1.5;--dpt-title-text-decoration:none;--dpt-title-text-transform:none;--dpt-excerpt-font-style:normal;--dpt-excerpt-font-weight:400;--dpt-excerpt-line-height:1.5;--dpt-excerpt-text-decoration:none;--dpt-excerpt-text-transform:none;--dpt-meta1-font-style:normal;--dpt-meta1-font-weight:400;--dpt-meta1-line-height:1.9;--dpt-meta1-text-decoration:none;--dpt-meta1-text-transform:none;--dpt-meta2-font-style:normal;--dpt-meta2-font-weight:400;--dpt-meta2-line-height:1.9;--dpt-meta2-text-decoration:none;--dpt-meta2-text-transform:none; }<\/style><div class=\"dpt-main-header\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-main-title\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class=\"dpt-main-title-text\">Current articles on artificial intelligence<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t<div id=\"dpt-wrapper-828\" class=\"dpt-wrapper dpt-mag1 land1 dpt-cropped dpt-flex-wrap\" >\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"die neuen eu-zensurgesetze: was chatcontrol, dsa, emfa und der ai act bedeuten\" data-id=\"3586\"  data-category=\"allgemein gesellschaft ki-systeme\" data-post_tag=\"datenschutz digitales eigentum eu-gesetze europa k\u00fcnstliche intelligenz llm meinungsfreiheit spieltheorie sprachmodell\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/11\/the-new-eu-censorship-laws-what-chatcontrol-dsa-emfa-and-the-ai-act-mean\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">The new EU censorship laws: What Chatcontrol, DSA, EMFA and the AI Act mean<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"EU censorship laws\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/eu-zensurgesetze.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/eu-zensurgesetze.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/eu-zensurgesetze-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/eu-zensurgesetze-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/eu-zensurgesetze-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/eu-zensurgesetze-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/11\/the-new-eu-censorship-laws-what-chatcontrol-dsa-emfa-and-the-ai-act-mean\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">The new EU censorship laws: What Chatcontrol, DSA, EMFA and the AI Act mean<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"rag mit ollama und qdrant als universelle suchmaschine f\u00fcr eigene daten\" data-id=\"2764\"  data-category=\"filemaker &amp; erp ki-systeme\" data-post_tag=\"datenbanken docker k\u00fcnstliche intelligenz llama llm mistral ollama qdrant vektordatenbank\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/08\/rag-with-ollama-and-qdrant-as-a-universal-search-engine-for-your-own-data\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">RAG with Ollama and Qdrant as a universal search engine for own data<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1920\" height=\"640\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"Extend local AI with databases using RAG, Ollama and Qdrant\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/lokale-ki-rag-ollama-qdrant.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1920px) 100vw, 1920px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/lokale-ki-rag-ollama-qdrant.jpg 1920w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/lokale-ki-rag-ollama-qdrant-300x100.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/lokale-ki-rag-ollama-qdrant-1024x341.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/lokale-ki-rag-ollama-qdrant-768x256.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/lokale-ki-rag-ollama-qdrant-1536x512.jpg 1536w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/08\/rag-with-ollama-and-qdrant-as-a-universal-search-engine-for-your-own-data\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">RAG with Ollama and Qdrant as a universal search engine for own data<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"wie man heute schon ki-spezialisten ausbilden kann \u2013 chancen f\u00fcr unternehmen und azubis\" data-id=\"3120\"  data-category=\"allgemein b\u00fccher ki-systeme tipps &amp; anleitungen\" data-post_tag=\"buch datenbanken datenlogik denkmodelle k\u00fcnstliche intelligenz llm sprachmodell\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/10\/how-to-train-ki-specialists-today-opportunities-for-companies-and-trainees\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">How AI specialists can be trained today - opportunities for companies and trainees<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"Train an AI specialist\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ki-spezialist-ausbildung.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ki-spezialist-ausbildung.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ki-spezialist-ausbildung-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ki-spezialist-ausbildung-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ki-spezialist-ausbildung-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ki-spezialist-ausbildung-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/10\/how-to-train-ki-specialists-today-opportunities-for-companies-and-trainees\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">How AI specialists can be trained today - opportunities for companies and trainees<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry has-thumbnail\" data-title=\"ki als sparringspartner nutzen: wie denken im dialog produktiver wird\" data-id=\"4121\"  data-category=\"b\u00fccher ki-systeme tipps &amp; anleitungen\" data-post_tag=\"buch datenlogik denkmodelle k\u00fcnstliche intelligenz lernen llm ratgeber sprachmodell\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"dpt-entry-wrapper\"><div class=\"dpt-featured-content\"><div class=\"dpt-permalink\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/12\/using-ki-as-a-sparring-partner-how-thinking-becomes-more-productive-in-dialog\/\" class=\"dpt-permalink\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Using AI as a sparring partner: How thinking in dialog becomes more productive<\/span><\/a><\/div><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail\"><div class=\"dpt-thumbnail-inner\"><img width=\"1536\" height=\"1024\" class=\"attachment-full size-full\" alt=\"AI as a savings partner\" context=\"dpt\" data-dpt-src=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ki-als-sparringspartner-laptop.jpg\" data-dpt-sizes=\"(max-width: 1536px) 100vw, 1536px\" data-dpt-srcset=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ki-als-sparringspartner-laptop.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ki-als-sparringspartner-laptop-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ki-als-sparringspartner-laptop-1024x683.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ki-als-sparringspartner-laptop-768x512.jpg 768w, https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/ki-als-sparringspartner-laptop-18x12.jpg 18w\" \/><\/div><span class=\"dpt-thumbnail-aspect-ratio\" style=\"padding-top: 75%\"><\/span><\/div><\/div><div class=\"sub-entry\"><h3 class=\"dpt-title\"><a class=\"dpt-title-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/12\/using-ki-as-a-sparring-partner-how-thinking-becomes-more-productive-in-dialog\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">Using AI as a sparring partner: How thinking in dialog becomes more productive<\/a><\/h3><\/div><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div><!-- .dpt-entry -->\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\n<hr \/>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This article is not the result of a current impulse, indignation or partisanship. Rather, it is the result of a long period of observation - and a growing sense of unease. I have been studying Russia not just since the war in Ukraine. My interest goes back further. I had already studied Russian as a foreign language at school, and ... <a title=\"Using AI as a sparring partner: How thinking in dialog becomes more productive\" class=\"read-more\" href=\"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/2025\/12\/using-ki-as-a-sparring-partner-how-thinking-becomes-more-productive-in-dialog\/\" aria-label=\"Read more about Using AI as a sparring partner: How thinking in dialog becomes more productive\">Read more<\/a><\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4894,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"iawp_total_views":738,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1,466],"tags":[480,481,470,475,482,426,476,484],"class_list":["post-4801","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-allgemein","category-gesellschaft","tag-deutschland","tag-energiepolitik","tag-eu-gesetze","tag-europa","tag-geopolitik","tag-krisen","tag-meinungsfreiheit","tag-sicherheitspolitik"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4801","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4801"}],"version-history":[{"count":31,"href":"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4801\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5601,"href":"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4801\/revisions\/5601"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4894"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4801"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4801"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.markus-schall.de\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4801"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}